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ABSTRACT 
This project describes NASA’s culture during two important time periods 
(1958—1972) and (1996—2004) and explains its relative fit with its system 
components— task, people, resources, and structure. The open-system model is 
used to explain how system components affect culture and how culture affects 
them. During the first period (1958—1972), NASA was established and it landed 
the first man on the moon, a remarkable accomplishment given the advances in 
science and technology required to complete this mission. During the second 
period (1996—2004), the Columbia accident occurred, causing NASA’s image to 
be tarnished and its credibility with key stakeholders to be compromised. 
To conduct this research, books, online resources, newspaper article, 
technical and investigative reports and theses provided the main sources of 
information.  
Project results indicate that culture alone is not the only contributory factor 
to NASA’s performance. The space agency‘s technical culture closely aligned 
with system components enabled the organization to complete its e moon-
landing mission. However, NASA culture changed due to alterations in the 
system components. A misalignment between culture and its system 
components occurred during the second period, causing the Columbia accident. 
Therefore, the alignment between culture and other components is essential for 
NASA to perform its missions effectively. NASA leadership should monitor and 
assess this alignment to help prevent future mishaps.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This research examined the interaction of external and internal 
organizational variables affecting cultural changes occurring in NASA (National 
Aeronautic Space Administration) during different time-periods.  To the extent 
that organizational cultural behaviors played some substantial part in the 
unfortunate Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) shuttle disasters, then 
exploring cultural relationships and impacts is a worthwhile endeavor.  The 
objective is to learn more about how enduring differences in organizational 
values and other interacting variables can generate powerful organizational 
cultures and sub-cultures, thereby impacting performance.  This study also 
supports, upholds and augments the very goal of the shuttles missions which 
was to learn about humans exploring space. 
Two timeframes were selected and evaluated to describe and analyze 
aspects of NASA’s structural, political and cultural history. In the first timeframe, 
1958–1972, cultural characteristics are described which may have positively 
contributed to the successful landing and return of a man on the moon. During 
the second timeframe, 1996–2004, culturally relevant factors are described and 
analyzed in terms of possible negative impacts to the Columbia shuttle disaster. 
These two timeframes represent fundamental yet different configurations of 
NASA’s history viewed from the perspective of organizational culture and 
performance. 
The goal of the project was to identify, describe, and analyze variables 
contributing to NASA’s dominant and alternative cultures during the two different 
time periods. Organizational culture is defined here as:  a pattern of basic 
assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, as it learns to 
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has  
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worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems. (Schein, 1990, p. 111) 
Open systems theory provides a useful theoretical foundation for the 
study, including using the McCaskey model (1974) as the primary diagnostic 
instrument.  For reasons explained later, the model is modified by placing culture 
at the center and referring to other components as explanatory variables, e.g., 
context, structure, task, people, and resources. A system is any set of interacting 
components working together towards some common purpose (Senge, 2006).  
Theoretically, the extent to which key variables are aligned or congruent 
determines organizational performance.  This concept reflects both the central 
hypothesis of systems thinking and the construct used to relate variables 
interrelationships to each other.  A fit among the patterns of relevant contextual, 
structural and strategic factors will yield better performance than misfits will 
(Doty, 1993). Donaldson concurs in that, “misfit produces negative effects on 
organizational performance” (1987, p. 15). Organizational leaders striving to 
develop the kind of cultures which produce superlative performance would 
therefore need to understand the central role culture can play in affecting 
organizational outcomes, including intended and unintended consequences.  
B. BACKGROUND 
After the Second World War, the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union emerged and continued for over four decades. The Cold War 
was generally recognized as a fundamental struggle between 
democracy/capitalism and communism. The space race took on both a symbolic 
and military meaning for most Americans.  When the Soviet Union succeeded in 
launching Sputnik, United States citizens and people’s from other nations 
perceived that the United States might be losing the space race, and communism 
was winning (Launius, 1995). The societal and political pressures were on to  
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catch up to and overtake the Soviet Union in the space race. This context 
contributed to the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) (Launius, 1995; McCurdy, 1993). 
NASA was established in 1958 to explore space and to better understand 
our own planet and the universe around us. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy 
inspired the nation and created a powerful and compelling vision about sending a 
man to the moon and returning him safely before the end of the decade.  
From establishment to the mid 1970s, NASA received substantial financial 
and management support from the President, Congress, and the American 
people. During this period, NASA landed the first man on the moon, developed 
preeminent technological skills, and became the pride of the nation and parts of 
the world. After this tremendous accomplishment and into the 1970s, the United 
States became preoccupied with the Vietnam War (Launius, 1995; McCurdy, 
1993). Consequently, societal harmony and overall economic conditions 
deteriorated, including imminent governmental budget cuts for the years ahead. 
NASA was a successful, entrepreneurial and maturing organization and 
management developed diverse goals to survive and stimulate growth. Among 
these goals were implementing space explorations to solve problems on Earth, 
reducing space exploration costs, and routinely accessing space with shuttles. 
As contextual and internal organizational design factors continued to 
change into the 1980s, NASA experienced some failures, e.g., the Challenger 
disaster in 1986 which exploded during takeoff killing all seven astronauts. 
President Reagan ordered the Rogers Commission to investigate the accident 
which found – among other things – that shuttle design flaws contributed heavily 
to the Challenger’s explosion. Basically, the Space Shuttle Challenger 
disintegrated when an O-ring seal in a solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at 
liftoff. The ruptured seal and failed backup seal allowed a breach in the SRB 
joint, which allowed escaped gases to combust upon reaching the outside 
attachment hardware and external fuel tank. The SRB breach flare caused 
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both the separation of the right-hand SRB and the structural failure of the 
external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the shuttle in 73 seconds after 
liftoff with all seven souls on board killed.1  
During the Challenger investigation, the Rogers Commission found that 
some senior managers and NASA engineers knew the design problem existed 
and failed to act appropriately on contested, but available information. Although 
data about the problem was discussed the day before takeoff, why did NASA 
decision makers fail to prevent the launch? One stunning explanation for this 
failure to take appropriate action was that NASA’s cultural conflicts may have 
prevented or clouded rational decision-making by losing sight of crucial safety 
parameters, including a gap between engineering and managerial cultures.  
Sapienza (1987) asserts that culture can affect the mechanisms whereby 
decision makers perceive and interpret data, i.e., shaping the importance that 
managers attach to incoming information.  
Seventeen years later on February 1, 2003, the Columbia space shuttle 
disintegrated when entering the atmosphere after a 16-day science mission and 
all seven astronauts died. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
was established and reported its findings. Interestingly, although the foam 
problem that caused the accident was known by both senior managers and 
engineers soon after takeoff, ineffective decision-making once more loomed, i.e., 
the CAIB highly criticized the management and culture of NASA. 
Both accidents show that cultural analysis of NASA is reasonable and 
necessary to search for causation factors and preventive actions. Since 
organizational culture includes deeply ingrained behaviors, language, and 
repeated patterns, which are often difficult and slow to change, this analysis 
includes relevant contextual factors and organizational components likely 
affecting culture.  
                                            
1 See for more technical information at Houston Chronicle, Chron.com, 
http://www.chron.com/content/interactive/special/challenger/docs/report.html, (accessed October 
2007). 
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Clearly, NASA has existed for many years and its culture has evolved with 
the development of the agency over time. Meek (1988, p. 464) stated, “People do 
not just passively absorb meanings and symbols; they produce and reproduce 
culture and in the process of reproducing it, they may transform it.” Cultural 
transformation can take a long time to occur and is decidedly complex which 
appears to be a good fit for a longitudinal approach.  
The study is pseudo-longitudinal in that it compares NASA’s Columbia 
(1996–2004) and  man-on-the moon periods (1958–1972). The Columbia 
period is particularly important both because it is closer to the present time, and 
because it may delineate a marked contrast from NASA’s earlier successful 
moon accomplishments.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
• To what extent did aspects of NASA’s culture support (degrade) its 
mission and tasking during the “man-on-the-moon” period (1958–
1972) and during the space shuttle period prior to the Columbia 
disaster (1996–2004)? 
• To what extent did identifiable variables contribute to developing an 
incongruent NASA culture, and what can decision makers learn 
about intervening and changing variables under their control for 
greater alignment of internal and external factors, thereby positively 
affecting culture and organizational performance? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• How can NASA’s culture between 1958–1972 and 1996–2004 be 
described? 
• What appear to be the primary contributing factors (driving forces) 
to NASA’s culture during those two periods? 
• To what extent were NASA’s cultural variables congruent or 
incongruent with relevant tasks during 1958–1972? 
• To what extent were NASA’s cultural variables congruent or 
incongruent with relevant tasks during 1996–2004? 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
This project adopted an open-systems theory framework, particularly in 
terms of describing an organizational system using a model developed by 
McCaskey (1974).  The model was changed slightly by placing culture at the 
center of the model, opposed to viewing culture as a result of the interaction 
among external environmental variables and internal organizational design 
factors. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I introduces the topic, and chapter II examines literature on the 
relative importance of organizational culture, including a brief historical depiction 
of cultural domains, i.e., how culture may affect organizational functions and 
processes. Chapter III reviews McCaskey’s organizational systems model and 
open-system theory and relates them to the cultural concept. Chapter IV 
describes NASA’s early cultural formation and other relevant characteristics 
during the “man-on–the-moon” period (1958–1972) and analyzes overall fit with 
the task, people, structure, and resources. In Chapter V, the characteristics of 
NASA’s culture during the Columbia period (1996–2004) are analyzed including 
fit with task, people, structure, and resources. Finally, chapter VI summarizes the 
findings and incorporates them into recommendations for assisting managers in 
diagnosing and positively influencing their organizational cultures.  
F. LIMITATIONS  
We have tried to show the alignment of NASA’s organizational 
components and its culture within academic and course time constraints. All 
deductions are based on documents and literature sources due to an inability to 
interview NASA personnel.  As stated, two fairly distinct periods of NASA’s 
history only are analyzed: the-man-on-the moon period (1958–1972) and the 
Columbia period (1996–2004), e.g., the time period between 1972 and 1996 is 
not included in the study. 
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There are numerous environmental forces that could have affected 
NASA’s management and culture. This project focused on the President, 
Congress, and the space environment as primary environmental variables 
affecting the agency’s culture. Other environmental forces such as the effect of 








People deal with culture on a daily basis in their jobs, schools, and social 
groups, perhaps without recognizing its potential impacts on societal values and 
organizational performance.  Various professional groups—sociologists, 
psychologists and anthropologists—have studied culture, often concluding that 
both societal culture and organizational culture can run deep in terms of 
entrenched behaviors and accepted patterns.  A premise of this study is that 
managers and leaders are well advised to seek greater understanding of how 
culture evolves over time, particularly the challenge of positively influencing 
organizational culture. Various definitions, roles and references to culture appear 
frequently in contemporary social science academic and practitioner literature.  
The American Heritage Dictionary (2007) defines culture in the following 
two general ways:  
Culture is “the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, 
beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought; and  these 
patterns, traits, and products considered as the expression of a particular period, 
class, community, or population;” and/or culture is “the predominating attitudes 
and behavior that characterize the functioning of a group or organization.”  
In the first definition, culture refers to human beings in the broad, societal 
context as the product of human socialization. In this aspect, we can argue that 
understanding culture is equal to understanding human beings within defined 
social settings. In the second definition, the scope and context of culture narrows.  
Two or more persons working toward an objective can develop a culture unique 
to their group.  Isaac and Pitt (2001) add that “culture is an extremely subtle 
phenomenon” (Keyton, 2004, p.28).  
 10
The term culture appears to originate from social anthropology2 (Kotter, 
1992, p. 3). The first known publication to have culture in its title is the study of 
Edward B. Taylor’s “Primitive Culture” in 1877. In his study, Taylor acknowledged 
that primitive societies, such as Eskimo and Native American, have different 
ways of life from other nations, but also different ways of life among themselves 
(Kotter, 1992).  
In the organizational psychology field, Kaufman (1960) was an early 
researcher who analyzed the cultural characteristics of the U.S. Forest Service 
(McCurdy, 1993). He showed that forest rangers have a common culture 
although their organization is big in size with dispersed subunits, complex jobs 
and wide areas of responsibility. Kaufman observations were that “voluntary 
conformity”  reinforced by the culture of the organization among rangers was a 
more powerful force than budgets, procedure manuals, and other financial 
mechanisms in ensuring the predictability in the activities of field employees 
(McCurdy, 1993, p. 5). 
 In all likelihood, culture existed as people developed social life in the form 
of clans, groups, and communities. However, theoretical and empirical studies 
about business organizational culture gained popularity in the 1980s with the 
increase of globalization3. Managers and researchers started to become more 
aware of different cultures because of increasing business interactions with 
people from other nations and organizations. This opportunity led to increased 
efforts to understand cultural differences in order to handle cultural-related issues 
in business settings. Competition varies under the globalization concept, but 
many point to Japanese firms showing periods of exceptional performance in the 
U.S., e.g., the automotive industry from the 1970s to the present. A broad 
tendency to explain the success of Japanese firms with their distinctive cultures 
                                            
2 Social anthropology is defined as “the branch of anthropology that deals with human culture 
and society,” http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn, (accessed August 21, 2007. 
3  According to Waters (1995, p. 3), globalization refers to “a social process in which the 
constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people 
become increasingly aware that they are receding.” 
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emerged among researchers and business practitioners. Japanese societal 
values of collectivism (over individualism), and orientation towards harmony with 
man and nature may form the foundations of business practices such as life time 
employment and the central importance of team work. This interest in exploring 
differences in culture may have been stimulated by the reality or perception that 
the U.S. was losing its national competitive edge on the world scene (Schein, 
1996).  
Early cultural studies may have lacked a systematic approach analyzing 
all relevant cultural dimensions (Schein, 1990). According to Mackenzie, it is very 
difficult to come up with an accepted theory for explaining organizational culture 
since organizations are constantly evolving (Marcoulides and Heck, 1993, p. 
210). However, Mackenzie indicated that organizational culture is a helpful tool to 
use when assessing the relative fit of an organization’s goals, strategies, tasks, 
and resulting outcomes. 
Since there appears to be a plethora of organizational culture definitions, 
several further descriptions are provided.  Uttal (1983) defined culture as a 
“system of shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that 
interact with a company’s people, organizational structures, and control systems 
to produce behavioral norms” (p. 66). According to Williams, Dobson, and 
Walters (1989), organizational culture is “the basic pattern of shared 
assumptions, values, and beliefs considered to be the correct way of thinking 
about and acting on problems and opportunities facing the organization. It is a 
powerful template that shapes what happens in the organization” (McShane & 
Von Glinow, p. 253). Louis (1985) defined culture “as a set of understandings or 
meanings shared by a group of people. The meanings are largely tacit among 
the members, are clearly relevant to a particular group, and are distinctive to the 
group” (p. 74). Trice and Beyer (1993) noted, “organizational cultures, like other 
cultures, develop as a groups of people struggle to make sense of and cope with 
their world” (p. 4). 
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These different definitions suggest several important similarities about 
organizational culture. First, it consists of various levels of shared assumptions, 
values, and beliefs. Second, culture develops over time such that behaviors 
become normal, accepted and shared. Third, culture is transmitted and taught to 
new members in a process of socialization. Culture can guide organizational 
members’ behavior by framing their interpretation of the internal and external 
environment. To understand better, how organizational culture characteristics 
develop, different levels of culture are discussed. 
B. THE CONTENT OF CULTURE 
When one enters a different group, organization, or even country, culture 
shock is a general term used to describe an overall perception of loneliness or 
inability to fit in with the local group. Notable differences can include alternative 
behaviors, physical structures, symbols and language. Even after staying long 
enough to become accustomed to a new environment, “outsiders” may still have 
difficulty understanding some behaviors. The initial cultural experience is often 
the tip of the iceberg—the artifacts of culture. Becoming familiar with cultural 
layers would tend to increase an individual’s understanding of “the way things are 
done” in the new environment. The more the person knows about the culture, the 
more likely they are to understand why people behave the way they do. 
Organizational culture can be described in terms of two fundamental 
levels compared to an iceberg: visible parts (observable behaviors and artifacts), 
and invisible parts (values, beliefs, and assumptions). Using a tree as the 
metaphor, the roots become the less visible parts of culture, and the branches 
and leaves are the observable aspects.  
These broad cultural depictions are helpful yet insufficient for 
understanding the complex interrelationships of variables which may be involved 




Schein, 2004) divide culture into different levels, extending the number of levels 
by dividing the two main levels—visible and non-visible aspects of culture—into 
subgroups.  
Hofstede (1991) proposes four layers with each layer representing a 
separate category, i.e., peeling back the layers of an onion reveals a deeper, 
hidden layer, with values ending up at the core of his model. The other three 
levels are rituals, heroes, and symbols. Schein (2004) offers a three-layer cultural 
model shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Levels of Culture (From: Schein (2004)) 
As seen in Figure 1, culture may be a function of artifacts, espoused 
beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions, developing and emerging from 
the dynamic interaction of these layers. To the extent that the layers fit and are 
congruent, then the culture is highly reflective of its artifacts and espoused 
values.  Incongruence among variables may cause cultural dissonance, i.e., a 
society professing equality, yet not allowing women to work or drive. The next 
section uses Schein’s model to discuss cultural layers in more detail.  
Artifacts (visible) 





1. Layer 1: Artifacts 
Artifacts can be defined as the shell or the visible and concrete part of 
culture, often viewed as reflections of other deeper layers of culture, i.e., 
observed structures and data from the five senses. This category generally 
contains the architecture of a physical environment, language, technology, 
products, artistic creations, style, clothing, emotional displays, myths, stories, 
published list of values, observable rituals, and ceremonies (Dyer, 1985; Schein, 
1999, 2004)  
Although artifacts are easier to observe than other layers of culture and 
may appear to be easy to understand, Schein (2004) points out they may be 
difficult to decipher. An example is Egyptian and Mayan pyramids. The meaning 
of the structures in both societies was different, even though both resemble a 
similar pyramid shape. For the Egyptians, pyramids were tombs, and for the 
Mayans, pyramids were both tombs and temples. Therefore, care must be taken 
deriving meaning from artifacts, especially in different societies (Schein, 2004). 
Insider interpretations can be tacit and accurate compared to outsiders 
interpretations of the same data.  
Artifacts can be helpful indicators for interpreting organizational culture 
including strategic direction.  Amy (1990) conducted a cultural analysis of NASA 
by focusing on the language that NASA used to project its public image. She 
divided NASA’s history into Era One, the Apollo Era (1958-1969); Era Two, the 
Transition from Apollo to the Shuttle Era (1970-1981); and Era three, the 
Shuttle Era (1982-1986). She analyzed what kind of words and how frequently 
these words were used in NASA’s various publications. The changes that 
occurred in language were seen as indicative of changes in NASA’s cultural 
perspectives, values, and assumptions. She concluded that the use of significant 
words or phrases in NASA documents changed over the three areas in two ways. 
The first change entails how the key terms were associated with other words. 
The second change occurred in the frequency of word use. One of the 
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conclusions was that the definition of the key term “environment” changed over 
three eras, and the relationship with the “environment” also changed for NASA.  
In Era One, “environment” is used to refer to space “environment,” in the Second 
Era, it meant the space as well as the organizational “environment,” and in the 
Third Era, it related only to the organizational “environment.” 
Observers’ own feelings, knowledge, and assumptions can affect 
interpretation of artifacts. In other words, one’s own culture may distort the true 
meaning of artifacts from another culture. To get the true interpretation of 
artifacts, gaining insight of deeper levels of culture and evaluating artifacts 
together with beliefs, values, and assumptions are necessary (Schein, 2004). 
2. Layer 2: Beliefs, Values, and Norms 
Beliefs, values, and norms are often abstract and may constitute invisible 
parts of culture. Norms tell people (employees) how to behave under various 
conditions or circumstances, e.g., always wear a coat and tie. Morris (1956) 
defined norms as “generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or 
prohibitions against, others’ behavior, belief, or feeling, i.e. what others ought to 
do, believe, feel—or else” (p. 610). From an organizational perspective, norms 
are socially created expectations about which behaviors are acceptable and 
unacceptable. They are unconsciously accepted and used to guide behavior and 
to interpret the behavior of others. Norms also provide a sense of “ought-to-be” 
values. They can motivate group members and help them to rationalize their 
behaviors to achieve an expected outcome. Hofstede (1994) defined values as 
“broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (p. 8). 
Norms and values—sometimes used interchangeably in cultural studies - 




Norms include sanctions and values never do. Values can be held by one 
single individual, norms cannot. Values have only a subject—the believer—while 
norms have both subject and object—those who set the prescriptions and those 
to whom it applies.  (p. 610) 
Morris further explains that commonly held or established values often 
result in the formation of norms, but some norms may not depend on established 
values. Norms are accepted as assumptions by the group members. 
3. Layer 3: Assumptions 
Schein (2004) describes the process of development of an assumption in 
a group. He offers that once a group is formed, it faces new tasks, issues, or 
problems. Someone in the group offers a solution, and the group tries it in similar 
conditions until they believe in the reliability of the solution. After the group is 
convinced, they treat the solution as an assumption. In Schein’s view, the group 
develops assumptions to solve its internal integration issues in distributing power 
and influence, in developing desired peer relationship and intimacy, in rewarding 
and punishing certain kinds of behavior. 
The environment can set limits on what a group can do, and unpredictable 
and unexplainable events occur in turbulent environments. A group can also 
develop assumptions to help its members in handling environmental uncertainty 
and the pressure it creates. In short, a group can use assumptions as a collective 
defense mechanism to cope with both internal and external issues. Assumptions 
may not be negotiated as long as the actions resulting from the assumptions 
work out. When the group notices the old assumption is not reliable, it tries to 
develop a new assumption over time in a trial and error process.  
NASA management, after the Moon landing, faced budget constraints. 
They developed the assumption that if they successfully reduced the cost of 
space exploration by designing reusable shuttles and accessing the space 
routinely by increasing the number of space flights, Congress would support 
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them. They developed reusable shuttles, and made routine flight schedules. 
They continued to follow the scheduled flights, although the o-ring and the foam 
problems had occurred in previous flights. After many successful missions with 
the o-ring and foam problems, NASA developed another assumption in which the 
o-ring and foam problems were not seen as significant risks justifying delay of the 
shuttle  flights. These culturally driven assumptions may have contributed to the 
Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters. NASA was perhaps unable or 
unwilling to change its assumption about flight safety after the first Challenger 
accident.  Ott (1989) and Schein (2004) argue that looking at the underlying 
assumptions, which are at the essence of culture, is the most fruitful approach to 
culture. Without uncovering assumptions, cultural studies produce nothing. 
C. WHY IS CULTURE IMPORTANT? 
Organizational culture is arguably one of the most important forces 
affecting the overall performance of organizations. Culture’s remarkable 
influences appear to affect organizational leadership, decision-making, 
performance, internal development, and strategic development areas (Howard, 
1998; Quinn et al., 1991; Schein, 1996, 2004). Simircich (1983) emphasized the 
internal role of culture by referring to the following roles it plays: organizational 
culture is important in creating a sense of identity, promoting organizational 
commitment, enhancing social system stability, and serving as a sense making 
device that can guide and shape behavior.  
The open systems view of an organization extends the internal role of 
culture by adding another vital role: mediation in adaptation to the environment. A 
system is defined as a set of interrelated components working towards a 
common purpose (Senge, 2006), and the relative fit or congruence of the 
components determines performance. A misfit between organizational culture 




Schein (1992) concluded that merely adapting to the environment is not a 
guarantee for success, rather an organization must try to influence and manage 
its environment.  
Culture may be a fundament factor in the success of human-capital 
intensive, scientific organizations with a primary source of value being intellectual 
capital rather than material assets. Motivating and maximizing intellectual capital 
may require a thorough understanding of culture. For example, Southwest 
Airlines believing that “the company is only as good as its people” places much 
value on its people (Zellner, 1995). The critical task in Southwest was to keep 
airplanes flying with minimal turnaround time, requiring speed, teamwork and 
initiative (Rechard, 1994). To guarantee that it gets the right people, Southwest is 
extraordinarily selective in its recruiting. Evidently, if someone uses the word “I” 
too much in the interview, they are not hired (Chakravaty, 1991). Sometimes, 
even customers are involved in interviewing new flight attendants. It was very 
important to select the best person fitting the culture of the company. During 
Southwest’s hiring process, attitude is more important than skills because skills 
can be changed with training but attitudes are extremely difficult to change 
(Chakravaty, 1991). All new hires go through an extensive training in which they 
are exposed to the history, principles, values, mission, and culture of the 
company. To generate the emotional contact necessary to change, the entire 
flight crew team lives for a period of time together cut-off from phones, cars, and 
contact with the outside world. Then each team develops an action plan to 
ensure that their new behaviors are transferred to the work setting (Chakravaty, 
1991).  
Southwest successfully made the case that preserving the airlines culture 
was critical for performance. As the company got larger, employers were 
encouraged to think small, focusing on their immediate customers. In sum, 
Southwest has developed and maintained a culture of hard work, cost-
consciousness, dedication, customer service, and teamwork. The company’s  
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focus on these cultural characteristics helps the company to reduce employee 
turnover, to be the cost-leader in its niche market, and to gain one of the biggest 
returns on investments.  
NASA is similarly a knowledge-based, scientific organization assuming 
that scientific knowledge and technical skills are the key success factors to space 
travel.  NASA developed a “can-do” culture in the early years of the agency 
between 1958—1972 by placing high value on the accumulation of scientific and 
engineering skills necessary to explore space. Testing and careful approach to 
every detail were another cultural assumption that contributed to high 
performance. In a relatively short time, NASA was seen as the most successful 
and reliable government agency and became known throughout the world for its 
successes in space exploration.  
Culture is a two edged sword, also posing a substantial barrier to 
organizational change.  As organizations evolve and change over time, their 
cultures also evolve, although more slowly (Davis, 1982; Meek, 1988; Schein, 
2004). Leaders would therefore be advised to diagnose their cultures, and to 
positively influence them by ensuring their interventions are congruent among 
important variables, i.e., environmental factors aligned with direction, aligned with 
design factors. Without leadership and alignment, culture can be a contributing 
factor to failure through resisting change and/or dysfunctional behaviors (Heskett 
& Kotter, 1992).  
Analysis of how culture contributes to critical events at certain times can 
be conducted by considering organizational history. Pettigrew (1979) has 
suggested that “the point of studying a sequence of social dramas longitudinally 
is that they provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution, transformation, 
and, conceivably, decay of an organization over time” (pp. 570-571).   Ultimately, 
the history of a company has an influence on culture and organization. 
 
 20
Assuming the final and common goal of all management activities is to 
enhance performance by implementing effective control mechanisms, further 
discussion is provided about the role that culture plays as a social control 
mechanism and performance-enhancing tool in organizations. 
1. Culture as a Social Control Mechanism 
Culture can be a helpful tool or key variable in increasing the control 
function of management in the overall organization (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). 
Managers, especially those who view decision-making from a rational, empirical 
perspective, may perceive cultural analysis to be of little value. One reason is 
that culture is not readily visible and thus hard to measure (Schein, 2004). 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) have pointed out that management control 
includes “all the devices or systems managers use to ensure that the behaviors 
and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organization’s overall 
objectives and strategies” (p. 4). Culture is one of those devices. 
 The expected benefit from management control systems is to increase 
the possibility of reaching organizational objective(s) by influencing behaviors of 
employees in a desirable way. Examples of formal management control systems 
are financial planning systems, budgets, inventory control, and safety programs. 
These formal control systems are designed to guide employee behaviors. For 
example, a marketing department controls its cost to comply with the planned 
budget.  
Although managers design and employ formal control systems to prevent 
undesirable behaviors, they may not ever be able to eliminate all of the control 
problems (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). For this reason, managers in 
search of effective controls can become adept at diagnosing and influencing 
culture as a form of internal control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Tushman 




employees’ thought processes (Hall, 1984). When employees internalize the 
cultural characteristics of the organization, they act within the limits as set out by 
what is culturally acceptable.  
Because culture influences how employees act, the process of cultural 
control can occur in the following way. Groups exert pressure on individuals who 
deviate from group norms and values.  The group’s cultural norms are embodied 
in written and unwritten rules that govern their behavior (O’Reilly &, Tushman 
1997). Individuals in a group often monitor each other and thus pressure others 
to act consistently with the norms of the group. It is easy to conclude that if the 
norms and the objectives of individuals, groups, and the organization are 
consistent with each other, then the norms can serve as control mechanisms. 
Otherwise, norms that are inconsistent with the objectives of a company can 
confuse group functions and performance.    
O’Reilly and Tushman (1997) have also suggested that if norms are 
shared widely and practiced widely, they can serve as a means of social control. 
Weak norms cannot easily create cohesion and commitment necessary for 
success. 
2. The Role of Culture in Performance 
Performance is a term used to show the degree of achievement of results, 
i.e., results as a product of contextual and design factors. Many factors 
(independent variables), such as technology, structure, resources, culture, size, 
and strategy, contribute to performance (dependent variable). In addition, 
contextual and design factors also affect each other; hence, it is difficult to 
measure which factors and  how much they contribute to performance and what 
kind of a dependency they have among themselves. Furthermore, several 
authors have argued that culture should not be treated as a variable affecting the 
outcomes (Trice & Beyer, 1984; Meek, 1988; Sacmann, 1991). They have 
advocated understanding and interpreting culture in qualitative methods.  
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However, important and useful theoretical models, research, and studies have 
been done to find whether culture and performance have a cause-effect 
relationship. 
 Barney (1991) stated that organizational culture is an intangible resource 
and can lead to higher performance if it is leveraged and utilized in a consistent 
manner with organizational goal(s). Peters and Waterman (1982), in their book In 
Search of Excellence, examined characteristics of the most successful American 
companies and found that culture is a leading contributing factor to organizational 
performance. Gordon (1985) examined service sectors, such as banking and 
utilities, to determine the relationship between performance and culture, and his 
conclusion was that high and low performing companies have different cultural 
profiles. Hesket and Kotter (1992), by analyzing many companies in the United 
States, brought up two points: strong cultures, if aligned with contextual factors, 
enhance performance; and strategically or contextually appropriate cultures can 
promote long-term success if norms and values are consistent with the changing 
environment. 
Schein (1996) made another point about the culture-performance 
relationship. He stated that subcultures, like dominant cultures, play a critical role 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization. He generally classifies 
subcultures into three different occupational cultures: operators, engineers, and 
executives. These three occupational cultures have developed different 
occupational assumptions in handling their jobs over time. Operators include line 
managers and workers and are the target group of management efforts to train 
and change. Engineers design and monitor the technology that underlies what 
the organization does. The engineers’ assumption is that humans are more 
complex than machines and employing capable machines and utilizing technical 
solutions to problems is easier and preferable. Operators feel themselves 
threatened by engineers. The executives handling daily management activities 
developed the assumption that their role is financial accountability. To keep the  
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company financially viable, they unconsciously conflict with the other 
occupational groups when playing their role. Schein (1996) concludes that 
integration of occupational cultures would result in higher performance. 
Hesket and Kotter (1992) have also suggested that “performance-
enhancing cultures usually erode over time, either because they are not 
effectively passed on to the  new management needed in a growing business or 
because time and success and other factors blur people’s memories about why 
they were successful in the first place” (p. 144). NASA, in the “man-on-the-moon” 
period, had a culture enabling it to obtain superior performance. This research 
analyzes why that performance was not passed on to new members, thereby 
resulting in apparent cultural and performance erosion over time.  
The prevailing logic is that performance would be enhanced if the common 
behaviors and methods of doing business fit the company’s environment. Strong 
cultures that do not fit a company’s environment can lead intelligent people to 
behave destructively, undermining an organization’s ability to survive and 
prosper (Hesket &, Kotter 1992). Although NASA had a strong culture that fit its 
environment, supported its strategy, and thus contributed to its high performance 
between 1958—1972, NASA’s culture between 1996—2004 had a weak degree 
of fit with its environment and was not adequately aligned with its strategy and its 
systems. These misalignments may have contributed to the Columbia accident.  
Future chapters will describe and analyze these two periods of NASA culture in 
more detail. 
To the extent that culture is “what the organization is about,” then it is 
worth analyzing and understanding. Culture also obviously affects people outside 
the organization in terms of customer interaction, vendors, contractors, and 
regulators. In the next chapter, McCaskey’s organizational framework and open 
systems theory are described to place culture in theoretical frameworks showing 
its relationship with other system components.  
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III. OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL  
This chapter applies McCaskey’s organizational systems framework to 
describe NASA culture.  Culture has been placed at the center of the model, 
using other components such as structure, task, people, and resources as 
explanatory variables to understand NASA’s culture at different time periods.  
The extent to which key variables are aligned or incongruent will be analyzed and 
used to explain NASA performance during the two time periods of 1958—1972 
and 1996—2004.  The chapter also provides an overview of open system theory 
and McCaskey model components, including the importance of the alignment 
between design factors and organizational culture. 
The value of using a systems approach for diagnosing organizational 
problems can be appreciated by managers, because they may have greater 
relative control over design components. People and tasks are two design 
components where managers typically have greater influence, i.e., managers are 
involved in hiring processes and task employees to do a myriad of things.  These 
factors appear directly to affect human resource decisions and efficiency and 
productivity results (system outputs). 
The McCaskey model is an organizational systems framework comprised 
of three basic parts, which all systems have in common:  inputs, throughputs and 
outputs.  The input section focuses on internal and external factors that create 
direction and set boundaries for the organization.  Examples of external 
environmental factors include socio-economic, political and technological forces 
and trends.  Typically, organizational leaders set direction through inputs such as 
mission, vision, goals, policies and strategies.  Throughputs refers to the black 
box of management, where managers intervene in terms of job tasks, structure, 
technology, and people.  A distinct difference between our model and the 
McCaskey model is that culture is being purposefully viewed as a part of the 
throughput process, interacting with other system components or design factors. 
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A. OPEN SYSTEMS THEORY 
Open systems theory, according to Nadler and Tushman, is a general 
framework for conceptualizing organizational behavior over time.  A system is a 
“set of interrelated elements,” and these elements are interdependent such that 
changes in the nature of one component may lead to changes in the nature of 
the other components (Nadler & Tushman, 1992).  In other words, each 
component of the system interacts with each other and has the ability to 
influence other components.  The distinct difference between an open versus a 
closed system is that a closed system has a minimal relationship with the 
external environment.  There is a difference between components that reside 
inside the system and outside environmental factors trying to penetrate the 
system; however, deciphering between the inside components and external 
factors can be difficult.  
Figure 2 shows a basic, open systems model.  The McCaskey model is an 
open system because the system relies on its external environment for inputs to 
support the transformation process described by the model’s components or  
design format. 
 
Figure 2.   Elementary System Model (After: Nadler & Trushman (1992)) 
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Closed systems can exist relatively independent of the external 
environment. An example of a closed system would be a terrarium, completely 
self-contained and insulated from the external environment (Nadler & Tushman, 
1992).  The self-containment of closed systems limits the amount of influence 
placed on the system from external factors such as the environment.  An open 
systems approach works well for our analysis because NASA’s external 
environment helped shape the organization.  The modified McCaskey model is a 
useful tool to analyze NASA during the two periods because the model enables 
assessment of the degree of fit or alignment between culture and the system 
components during the two time periods.  
Nadler and Tushman (1992) define congruence as the degree to which 
the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and structures of one component are 
consistent with the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and structures of another 
component.  Thus, fit is a measure of congruence between pairs of components.  
The greater the degree of congruence between components, the better the fit 
between them.  High degrees of congruence and fit result in more effective 
behavior at multiple organizational levels.   
Effective organizational behavior is defined as behavior that leads to 
higher levels of goal attainment, utilization of resources, and adaptation (Nadler 
& Tushman, 1992). When systems are misaligned or incongruent, the 
organization will generally not perform at a level required by its stakeholders to 
be successful.  The implications of the congruence hypothesis in this model is 
that managers continually diagnose their organizational system, determining the 
location and nature of inconsistent fits, then ensuring their intervening actions 
positively impact overall system congruence.  
This research adopts open system theory and the McCaskey’s model 
because they provide a solid theoretical foundation for analyzing organizational 




help explain organizational failures by assessing the degree of fit between culture 
and the system components. Figure 3 shows the modified model and its 
components.     
 
Figure 3.   The Modified Model (After: Nadler & Trushman (1997) and Roberts, 
2000) 
B. OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL — MODIFIED  
1. Input 
In the modified McCaskey model, the inputs that influence organizational 
behavior are the external environment and NASA’s organizational strategy.  The 
environment comprises both external and internal factors.  Examples of external 
factors are markets, government, and competitors.  External factors, which 
appeared to influence NASA greatly, are U.S. government policies and 
competition from other countries, particularly the USSR.  The President outlines 
the overall National strategy and agenda, which is then communicated to the 
agencies responsible for implementing a plan of action to support the direction 
given.  Congress is charged with ensuring each agency’s objectives are aligned 
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with the President’s by passing the budget that allocates the funds used by the 
agencies.  When President Kennedy announced that the US would place a man 
on the moon by the end of the decade, it placed tremendous pressure on NASA 
to ensure the mission was accomplished.  At that time, Congress appropriated 
the dollars for the mission and there was strong public support as well. 
Laws and government regulations can affect organizational behaviors, 
including regulatory, hiring and funding constraints. For example, when Congress 
authorized the establishment of NASA the organization had the legal authority to 
seek space exploration.  NASA was also given the legal authority to spend 
money on space exploration by way of appropriated funds passed by Congress 
and signed by the President.  
Competitors can also be an important external factor in that successful 
organizations are likely to experience direct competition, i.e., the United States 
and the USSR were competing in a space race, and political and public 
perceptions between 1958—1965 was that Russia was winning the race. Losing 
the space race became unacceptable and drastic measures were deemed 
necessary. The formation of NASA and the significant funding provided to 
complete the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo projects were two sizable measures 
the US employed to overtake the USSR in the space race.  
Some organizations continually adjust and redefine their industry 
positions, including their relationship with society.  One way an organization 
defines itself is through their strategic plans and intentions including their 
mission, vision and strategic objectives.  An organization’s mission statement is 
meant to summarize their strategic competencies and how those competencies 
relate to its goals.  A vision statement may project broader ideals and values 
deemed important for accomplishing long term goals.  Strategic objectives often 
describe how an organization intends to accomplish its mission, vision and goals.  
Therefore, an organization’s most crucial input can be its intended direction, 
summarized through its espoused mission, vision and strategic goals (Nadler & 
Tushman, 1992).  NASA was formed to re-establish US dominance in space and 
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science.  Therefore, the strategy developed for NASA in the early stages was 
fairly specific aimed at manned-space flight.  After the “Moon Mission” was 
accomplished, NASA had some difficulty redefining its organizational strategy, 
clarifying its new mission, and reworking its strategic objectives.   
2. System Components 
a. Task Component 
Primary system components comprising the McCaskey model are 
task, people, organizational structure, and resources. The logic is that NASA’s 
performance would be greatly affected in terms of assigned tasks, the 
knowledge, skills and abilities of its scientists and engineers, how it structures or 
coordinates its complex activities, and resource availability.  
The task component examines the nature of the task and the extent 
and nature of interdependence between task performers.  Simply put, the task 
design factor focuses on the “work” that is being done  It can be important 
determining the extent to which tasks are related to organizational rewards, 
because rewards can signal task prioritization, including what does not get done. 
The relationship between organizational rewards and priorities matters because if 
organizations reward employees for actions that do not focus on organizational 
objectives, then stakeholder needs and expectations may suffer, thereby 
resulting in degraded performance.  If the tasks at NASA did not support the 
advancement and success in space exploration, then it would risk funding 
reductions as well as negative publicity, all of which would impact organizational 
culture.  Congress attempts to appropriate funds to agencies whose objectives 
and performance are aligned with National Strategy, including serving public 
interest.   
Organizational culture can impact tasks both in terms of 
determining which tasks are actually performed and how they are performed.  
Again, the notion of congruence is the central theme in that the extent to which 
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tasks are tied to organizational objectives and rewards, including the type of 
culture needed to accomplish all its critical tasking, then organizational 
performance will be high.  
There are three specific ways of analyzing how work flows within an 
organization.  Work is either pooled, sequential, or reciprocal in which each type 
of interdependence has distinct characteristics that affect the congruence 
between the other system components.  Pooled interdependence is considered 
to be the simplest form to manage due to a lack of coordination needed between 
the systems and structures affected.  According to Tushman and O’Reilly, pooled 
interdependence exists when component tasks have no linkage with one 
another; that is, each subunit does its own work, and the larger system’s 
performance is simply the sum of each subunit’s output.  The early years of 
NASA provides an excellent example of this type of interdependence.  Each of 
the centers under the NASA umbrella was responsible for separate components; 
however, the consolidated product was credited to NASA.  Chapter IV provides 
greater detail as to what tasks each center was responsible for during NASA’s 
early years.  Sequential interdependence exists when component tasks are 
linked in a linear sequence (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997).  Each unit is directly 
dependent on the unit preceding it; this dependence is similar to an assembly 
line.  Reciprocal interdependence exists when each component task is inherently 
linked to other tasks; that is, the completion of one component task is dependent 
not only on the preceding task but also those that follow (Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1997).  Reciprocal interdependence is more complex and is dependent on the 
use of interlinked feedback loops that provide for the needed collaboration, 
teamwork, and trust to accomplish the job task.  Figure 4 provides a simple 
diagram of how each one of the interdependencies are designed to operate. 
After NASA’s start-up and particularly during the Project Apollo 
period, the organization’s work required reciprocal interdependence due to the 
complexity of its mission. Space exploration is highly technical and thus requires 
significant collaboration to complete complex tasks. This collaboration is 
 32
exemplified in NASA’s use of project teams consisting of engineers, scientists, 
and contractors working in separate areas of the organization.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Type of Interdependencies (After: Nadler & Trushman (1997)) 
b. People Component 
The people component refers to individuals comprising the 
organization including how many, demographic diversity and types of education 
and skills needed. This component raises two fundamental questions:  What 
knowledge, skills, and abilities do people bring to work, and how does the 
organization attract and retain talent?  These two questions are vital to an 
 33
organization when developing the workforce.  What is also important are the 
motivations behind the individuals seeking employment as well as their 
expectation of how they will be treated as employees. 
NASA required highly skilled workers to complete its projects; 
furthermore, the culture had to support the needs and expectations of these 
people to hire and to retain them. In other words, an organization can seek 
prospective workers who have values, beliefs, and personalities that fit well with 
the culture. In short, the people component and organizational culture become a 
crucial area of alignment for producing high performance.  
Organizational demographics refer to employee factors such as 
age, gender, and cultural backgrounds.  The greater the demographic 
differences, the greater the potential for team conflict (Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1997).  However, diversity has been seen by some human resource 
professionals as an organizational strength, particularly when innovation and 
creativity are needed.  In a work environment that demands highly skilled 
scientists and engineers, it could be a challenge also trying to balance diversity 
factors.  
NASA attracted top scientists and engineers from around the world. 
The organization’s interest was talent rather than age, gender, or cultural 
background. This attitude created a culture of hiring highly intelligent, results 
oriented people.  Also, the internal and external environment created a culture of 
constant pressure; therefore, the managers, engineers, and scientists NASA 
hired had to be equipped to handle these pressures. 
Beyond competencies, managers can gather data on individual 
differences in motivation so that they can design reward systems that are aligned 
with both individual needs and critical tasks (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997).  As 
indicated earlier, it is vital for managers to assess the motivations of their 
subordinates to put in place the correct reward systems aligned with individual 
needs as well as critical tasks.  According to David McClelland’s theory of needs; 
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an individual’s motivation and effectiveness in certain job functions are influenced 
by achievement, affiliation, or power (McClelland, 1961).  People with a high 
need for achievement seek to excel.  Individuals with a high need for affiliation 
need harmonious relationships with other people and need to feel accepted by 
those people, although people from different organizational and national cultures 
define harmonious relations in different way.  Those in need of power may seek 
personal power over others, or the more beneficial need of having power to 
organize the efforts of others and to achieve organizational goals.  The culture 
created from professionals with high achievement needs values task completion 
and mission accomplishment. 
c. Structure Component 
Organizational structure often defines roles and functions, including 
the following main components: 
• It designates formal reporting relationships, the number of levels in 
a hierarchy, and the span of control of managers and supervisors. 
• It identifies grouping of individuals into departments and of 
departments into the total organization. 
• It determines the design of systems to ensure effective 
communication, coordination, and integration of efforts across 
organizational departments (Daft, 2004). 
Culture and structure have no known specific relationship (Baligh, 
1994). However, culture over time becomes ingrained in the major processes 
and structure of organizations (Schein, 1999). From Schein’s point of view, the 
elements of formal organizational structure, such as the division of labor, 
decision-making processes, hierarchy of authority, control mechanisms, rules 
and regulations, norms, and job descriptions are also indications of 
organizational culture.  
According to Mintzberg: “effective organizations achieve coherence 
among their component parts, [when] they do not change one element without 
considering the consequences to all of the others” (1979, p. 103). Span of 
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control, degree of job enlargement, form of decentralization, planning system and 
matrix structure should not be picked and chosen at random. Furthermore, these 
structural features should be selected to be consistent with the organizational 
context such as its age and size, the condition of the industry in which it 
operates, and its production technology.  
Minztberg (1979) classified the configurations of organizations into 
five groups: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, 
divisionalized form, and adhocracy. Each configuration is distinct in structural 
factors and situation, and the fit between structure and culture can be considered 
in designing organizational coordinating mechanisms.  For example, NASA 
required a culture of safety and risk aversion during the Columbia period; 
however, the safety division was not independent and reported to the same 
managers to whom the division provided recommendations for safe flights.    
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Table 1.   Dimensions of the five configurations (After: Minztberg (1979)) 
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Minztberg (1979) admits “none of the structural configurations so 
far discussed is capable of sophisticated innovation, the kind required of a space 
agency, an avant-garde film company, a factory manufacturing complex 
prototypes, or an integrated petrochemicals company.  The simple structure can 
certainly innovate, but only in a relatively limited way as the chief innovator is 
often the owner, manager and the CEO.  Both the machine and professional 
bureaucracies are traditional hierarchical bureaucracies, designed more for 
stability and predictability rather than to solve new and complex problems.  While 
the divisionalized form may be perfect for expanding using new divisions, it 
suffers from the functional redundancy and strategic inflexibility inherent in 
machine bureaucracies.  
NASA appears to reflect an adhocracy organizational structure, 
noting the difficulty for classifying any complex organization using a single 
description.  Adhocracy is known for its flexibility, apparently needed in 
organizations that must innovate and adapt quickly using diverse, expert talent.  
Administrative and operating types are two different forms of an adhocracy 
structure.  The administrative type develops and carries out projects in the name 
of the organization.  The operating type works on projects created by third 
parties, and aims to create tailored solutions for well-defined issues.  Also, an 
adhocracy relies on specialized experts to work together to develop innovative 
products.  Therefore, power is fluid throughout the organization and is given to 
the specialists as well as management depending on project status.  Another 
distinct difference of an adhocracy is that a project manager does not directly 
supervise a team.  Rather s/he is considered a contributing member of the team 
with additional duties surrounding inter-team coordination.  
d. Resource Component 
The resource component is comprised of the people, technology, 
financial resources, and industry capabilities available to the organization.  
Implicitly, this design factor describes what assets are available and used by the 
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organization to fulfill its mission.  People are the human resources of the 
organization comprising its intellectual capital.  Obviously, intellectual capital is 
crucial to the extent that the organization must create new solutions to new 
problems, including the ability to motivate and retain specialists.  
Technology is also considered an organizational resource because 
it can enable the organization to be innovative and more efficient.  There are 
many circumstances when an organization mixes people and technology to 
complete complex tasks.  For example, management information systems are 
often used in the public sector to capture droves of data, which then must be 
transformed into usable knowledge to assist decision makers in their governance 
tasks.    
Financial resources can include liquid capital, facilities, and 
organizational equipment and patents.  The primary financial capital available to 
NASA is appropriated funds from the President’s annual budget. These funds are 
used primarily for operating expenses as well as investment in research and 
development opportunities.  Also, NASA partnered with other U.S. companies 
and other countries on projects to defray overall costs and liabilities.  An example 
of a consolidated effort in a major project would be the development and 
sustainment of the International Space Station.  Chapter IV provides some 
details concerning NASA’s major contractors. 
e. Culture Component 
Although each separate system component can appear individually 
vital to organizational success, what is paramount is the interrelationships and 
interdependencies of the components creating a holistic system.  The premise of 
this study is that organizational culture serves as the nucleus or the glue that 
holds the system components together (see Figure 2).  As depicted in Figure 2, 
culture affects and is affected by each system component during the 
transformation process.  Culture is ingrained in every system component of the 
transformation process, and for an organization to operate effectively the various 
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components either work towards a common purpose, or become fragmented, 
i.e., tasks and organizational cultural alignment are crucial for success.  The 
critical job tasks simply cannot be in conflict with cultural norms, including the 
people component being congruent with organizational culture.  This means that 
the right person with the right skills is in the right job, and is supported and 
encouraged to perform based on structural and cultural congruencies.  People 
with similar work values, achievement needs, and motivations can create a whole 
greater than the sum of its parts.  Performance gaps can occur when the formal 
structure is not aligned with organizational culture. For example, if an 
organization is operating in a matrix structure known for violating the principle of 
unity of command, then the culture would need to be accepting and skilled in 
handling the accompanying conflict.  When NASA’s culture began turning more 
bureaucratic in the 1980s, the structure remained relatively flat, possibly creating 
performance issues.  And lastly, culture and resources must be congruent with 
one another to ensure that the resources are being used and expended 
consistent with the norms and values of the organization.  When an organization 
espouses high ethical norms, then activities like embezzling and Anti-deficiency 
Act (ADA) violations would introduce gaps in terms of intended and actual 
behaviors.     
3. Outputs 
The primary output of which this research is concerned is successful 
organizational performance, including what factors appear to relate to 
performance, and performance measurement or success criteria.  Performance 
in the private sector is more easily measured in financial terms of profit and 
return on investment.  When a public sector organization measures performance 
financially, it might focus instead on financial inputs, or the amount of money 
appropriated.  If a public organization overspends or underspends, it may incur 
an ADA violation in the former, and have its budget reduced the following year in 
the latter.   
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An example of a non-financial measurement used in the public sector is how 
efficient the organization accomplishes or is perceived to accomplish its goals.  
Efficiency can sometimes be measured in terms of outputs over inputs.  Also, 
when organizations become proactive in minimizing waste, then they are 
attempting to become more efficient. 
Open systems theory posits that if there is substantial congruence among 
all major system components, then organizational performance will be high.  This 
study analyzed two different periods in NASA’s history, 1958–1972 and 1996–2004, 
to ascertain the role of cultural congruency in impacting two different 
performance attainment periods.  
Described in the next chapter is NASA’s culture and how it was created in 
its infancy stages.  Specific system component characteristics of task, people, 
organizational structure, and resources prevalent in NASA during the 1958–
1972 period are also examined.  Finally, how those components influenced and 
were influenced by NASA culture is also described using a modified McCaskey 
model (Figure 2).  This assessment enables diagnosis of the degree of alignment 
between system components possibly leading to different performance 
characteristics in NASA during two periods. 
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IV. NASA CULTURE: TASK, PEOPLE, RESOURCES AND 
STRUCTURE ALIGNMENT 1958 TO 1972  
This chapter explains the formation of NASA as a space exploration 
organization and describes cultural factors from 1958 to 1972, including the 
degree of alignment of cultural attributes with organizational tasks, people, 
resources and structure.  
NASA’s process of creation is different from that of other governmental 
and private organizations in that it was not created “from scratch.” It evolved from 
the core of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and later it 
expanded by incorporating new groups from military organizations such as the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and the 
Vanguard Group of the Naval Research Laboratory. In addition, when NASA was 
given the mission of putting a man on the moon in 1961, the Johnson Space 
Center (originally called the Manned Spacecraft Center) in Houston and the 
Kennedy Space Center in Florida were built to make the agency capable of 
attaining its moon landing goals.  
Naturally, the pre-existing organizations incorporated into NASA had their 
own cultural attributes and history. Consequently, the building blocks of NASA’s 
culture came from these prior organizations, resulting in NASA’s culture 
developing as a confederation of these pre-existing organizational cultures 
(McCurdy, 1993). The variables of NASA’s culture from 1958 to 1972 are 
described to show how various characteristics likely contributed to the successful 
moon landing task.  
In the second part of the chapter, the degree of alignment of NASA’s 
culture with the other organizational components—task, people, resources and 
structure—are discussed since cultural variables alone can provide only a partial 
explanation of successful organizational performance. The theory is that the  
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extent of congruence among internal and external variables generates or 
contributes to an emerging organizational culture which positively impacts overall 
organizational performance (O’Reilly & Tushman, 1997). 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMATION OF NASA AND ITS CULTURE (1958-
1972) 
1. The Contribution of National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) and Military Services to NASA 
NASA was established by “The National Aeronautics and Space Act” on 
October1, 1958, with the peaceful purpose to explore the benefits of “space” for 
all mankind.4 The process of establishing NASA was different from the traditional 
formation of an organization in that it was not created “from scratch” by hiring 
new employees, buying new equipment, or building brand new facilities. It 
emerged from three “already existing” organizations. 
One of the “already existing” organizations included in NASA was the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The U.S. Congress 
established National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) “to supervise 
and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view to their 
practical solutions” in 1915 during World War I (McCurdy, 1993, p. 12). Although 
NACA pursued technically correct solutions to flight engineering problems, the 
space activities in the United States would benefit in later years because of this 
agency’s research and skills. In other words, the road to space research 
originally started with the formation of NACA.  
To support NACA in developing aircraft engines, Congress created three 
laboratories over 20 years: the Langley, Ames, and Levis laboratories.  
The Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (Langley) was established 
on a Virginia army base in 1920, primarily headed by engineers. This center, 
                                            
4 For more information: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, History Division, 
http://history.NASA.gov/spaceact.html, (accessed September 2007). 
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when transferred to NASA and was in charge of human space flight programs 
during NASA’s early years (1958–1963). A Special Space Task Group was in 
operation in Langley to supervise work on the Mercury space capsule which was 
one of the small-scale projects of the new space agency. Later, the laboratory 
sent its Space Task Group to the Houston Space Center. Langley also 
contributed to the establishment of the Flight Research Center (FRC) when it 
transferred a group of its engineers to FRC. 
The second laboratory created by Congress, the Ames Aeronautical 
Laboratory (Ames), was established in 1939 at Moffett Field in California to 
complement the work of Langley during WWII. The nucleus of Ames was again a 
group of engineers transferred from the Langley Laboratory who would lead this 
new laboratory. The core activity at Ames was high-speed flight research. 
Experts at Ames did preliminary work, which guided NASA in design of 
spacecraft.  
One year later, in 1940, the third laboratory, the Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory (Lewis) was added to the chain of NACA’s laboratories. Lewis was 
created in Cleveland, Ohio, to conduct research on aircraft engines. A research 
group at Lewis was able to develop a high-energy technology called the liquid-
hydrogen-fueled rocket, which contributed to NASA’s ability to reach the moon 
(McCurdy, 1993). 
The last research center of NACA was the Flight Research Center (FRC), 
which is now known as the Dryden Flight Research Center. It was established in 
1946 in the same way as prior laboratories by transferring a group of Langley 
engineers and technicians to facilities in Southern California’s Mojave Desert. 
This facility studied the dynamics of high-speed flight (McCurdy, 1993). FRC, 
with the Air Force and Bell Aeronautics, tested the Bell XS-1, a cigar-shaped 
experimental aircraft propelled by a rocket engine that consumed liquid oxygen 
and diluted alcohol (McCurdy, 1993). During 20 years of research and testing, 12 
aircraft were crushed and four test pilots died. These accidents reinforced the  
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notion that testing experimental aircrafts is inherently dangerous and accidents 
are part of this process. This reality would be further strengthened due to 
additional accidents, thereby infusing this orientation deeply into NASA’s culture. 
Each of these NACA research laboratories contributed to solve one aspect 
of space flight problems when the labs became part of NASA due to the Space 
Act in 1958. The Langley, Ames, and the Lewis laboratories provided the United 
States with its premier institutions for flight research in the building of space 
capabilities. 
McCurdy (1993) points out that these centers “maintained the culture of 
the research laboratory, of the engineers in charge, of the triumph of technology 
and scientific inquiry for problem solving” (p. 13). They maintained a tradition of 
technical detachment. Furthermore, their geographically isolated and distant 
locations kept these laboratories away from the politics of Washington, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the NACA laboratories did not have to report directly 
to the NACA headquarters in Washington, D.C. In addition, NACA had a small 
staff in its headquarters in Washington, which helped the laboratories to do their 
jobs without the pressure of politics and bureaucracy. 
As indicated earlier, The Space Act attached all these NACA research 
laboratories to NASA. In addition to these laboratories, NASA acquired staffs and 
facilities from the military services. From the Army, approximately 4,500 
employees, the big portion of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) under 
the leadership of German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, were transferred 
in April 1960 to NASA’s newly opened Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, 
Alabama. The von Braun team had successfully placed the first American 
satellite in orbit in 1958 before joining NASA. 
The von Braun team had a unique origin. It was originally formed in the 
1930s in Germany to develop a long-range rocket against Great Britain which 
was successfully launched in 1943. When the war ended, most of the rocket  
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engineers surrendered to the American troops, and were brought to the United 
States to continue their prior research on rocket development under the control of 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) in Huntsville, Alabama. 
The Army rocket team and its approximately 4,500 supporting employees 
were incorporated into the NASA’s newly opened Marshall Space Center. The 
rocket team brought its own cultural attributes into NASA. They were meticulous 
in their work, evidently strongly believing in the importance of close attention to 
details, including the continual development of improved rocketry. The rocket 
team apparently believed that the key to success was having complete control 
over projects and doing as much work as possible with their own staff. This habit 
became prevalent when the Army sent them to the Army Redstone Arsenal, a 
place for manufacturing munitions (McCurdy, 1993). Between 1950 and 1956, 
the rocket team developed the Redstone rocket with its own staff at Redstone 
Arsenal, which was used for the first live nuclear ballistic missile tests conducted 
by the United States. The army rocket team then developed the Jupiter-C, a 
modified Redstone rocket. The Jupiter-C successfully launched the first 
American satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. 
The second group transferred from the Army to NASA was the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), located in California. NASA also took control of JPL 
facilities in 1958. This laboratory was first established as a research laboratory in 
1943 for aeronautics and rocketry under the California Institute of Technology. 
This university was one of the nation’s best-regarded science and engineering 
research universities. JPL had a tradition of working closely with scientists 
outside the laboratory.  As an example, James Van Allen of the University of 
Iowa discovered the radiation belts encircling earth. The radiation belts bear his 
name and are now known as the Van Allen radiation belts. After 1940, JPL was 
turned into a contract operation for the U.S. Army. JPL worked with the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency to develop the first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1. 
JPL mostly dealt with unmanned flight issues in NASA with strong 
commitment to scientific research. The employees of JPL established their fame 
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as scientists who could send out probes to explore the solar system. They 
developed the Ranger and Surveyor probes that helped chart moon landing 
sites, thus enabling astronauts to land at predetermined moon locations, 
including developing the Mariner probes that visited Venus, Mercury and Mars. 
The Voyager twins, which flew, by Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune were 
also developed by them. 
The development of the Deep Space Network by JPL was a breakthrough 
for space activities.  Through this network, communication with probes traveling 
to other planets and their moons was established. 
2.  NASA’s Expansion with New Centers toward Manned Space 
Flight  
NASA, after the inclusion of the NACA’s research laboratories, wanted to 
have the ability to conduct its own operations in space. Formerly, manned space 
flight was the responsibility of Langley in the hands of a Special Space Task 
Group. To separate manned space flights from research and science work at 
Langley, NASA created a new center in 1962 located south of Houston  devoted 
to manned space flights and moved Langley’s Special Space Task Group there 
(McCurdy, 1993). This center, later renamed  the Johnson Space Center in 1973, 
housed the Mission Control Center from which manned space flights were 
directed.  
The Space Task Group logically brought aspects of NACA’s culture into 
the Johnson Space Center. Cultural attributes included the primary focus on 
research and testing, seeking technical solutions to space flight problems with 
minimal outside interference, and taking calculated risks to improve flights. These 
cultural features arguably contributed to the successful development of the 
Apollo space capsule, the lunar landing module, and the space shuttle orbiter. 
However, to build these complex ships, the Johnson Space Center had to rely 
heavily upon contractors, and thus it deviated from NACA’s “doing work in-
house” culture. 
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In fact, NASA built new facilities, the Goddard Space Center, in Maryland 
with the original intention of establishing both manned space flights with the 
Langley’s Space Task Group, and unmanned programs with the Vanguard Group 
of the Naval Research Laboratory, at the same center. Later, because of the 
moon-landing goal created by President Kennedy, the manned space flight 
program gained priority. The NASA management decided to shift the manned 
space program to the Johnson Space Center in Houston. Thus, the new facility in 
Maryland was left to be used only for unmanned flights. 
The Vanguard Group, while in control of the Navy, was working on a small 
scientific satellite in an in-house government facility in Washington, D.C. for the 
Department of Defense. It had a tradition of in-house work culture like the NACA 
research laboratories. The Vanguard Group moved from the Naval Research 
Laboratory to NASA’s Goddard Space Center with the Space Act. 
NASA still needed to expand to be capable of manned space flights. As a 
consequence, NASA built its own launch facilities on Merritt Island in Florida. In 
the beginning, the agency used the Air Force launch capability at Cape 
Canaveral, Florida, the same facility that the von Braun team had been using to 
launch rockets since 1950. The construction of NASA launch facilities began in 
1963, and NASA conducted its first launch from the Merritt Island facility for 
Apollo spacecraft in 19675. This facility took the name of the Kennedy Space 
Center and was organized by the Marshall space flight team.  The management 
of the center was given to the von Braun team.  
Finally, the last center NASA built was the Stennis Space Center (Stennis) 
in Mississippi. This location was chosen due to its water access which provided 
easy transportation of large rocket stages, components and propellants. The 
Stennis Space Center was designed to be the site of a test facility for launch 
vehicles to be used in the Apollo manned lunar landing program. The flight 
certification of the Saturn V rocket, which was used in the Apollo 11 mission that 
                                            
5 See for more information: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
http://www.nasa.gov, (accessed October 2007). 
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landed the first men on the moon, was done at Stennis.6 Later, space shuttle 
engines were also tested and certified there by expanding its test capability.  
3. NASA Culture (1958—1972) 
At the end of the NASA formation process, the agency contained its 
confederation of cultures from a collection of institutions. NACA with its three 
research laboratories—Langley, Ames, and Lewis—joined NASA enforcing its 
laboratory oriented culture. NASA also acquired a significant portion of the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency including the German rocket team, which became the 
Marshal Space Center. It built new field centers—the Johnson Space Center in 
Houston, for example—to increase its capability toward manned space flight. The 
Langley’s Space Task Group moved there and headed the center which resulted 
in development of a culture similar to that of NACA. Another field center was the 
Kennedy Space Center in Florida formed by the German rocket team. NASA also 
obtained a substantial number of employees from the Naval Research 
Laboratory and developed the Goddard Space Flight Center for unmanned space 
flight operations with employees from the Naval Research Laboratory. The Jet 
propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology was also attached 
to NASA. As part of the manned space activity, NASA also took rockets and 
managers from the Air Force Ballistic Missile Program. Figure 5 displays the 
NASA Centers in 1961.  
                                            
6 See for more information: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Stennis Space 
Center, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/stennis/about/history/history.html, accessed October 2007. 
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Figure 5.   NASA Centers (From: McCurdy (1993)) 
In sum, each institution, center, and group constituted key aspects of 
NASA’s emerging culture leading eventually to a distinct NASA culture. Research 
and testing, in-house technical capability, hands-on experience, seeing risk and 
failures as part of normal space exploration, a frontier mentality and hiring 
exceptional people were distinctive cultural variables during NASA’s first period 
(1958–1972). 
a. Research and Testing 
NACA, which had a long history since 1915, was the premier 
institution for aeronautical research in the United States before joining NASA. As 
indicated earlier, its three research laboratories were relatively small 
organizations and isolated from the major administrative operations of the federal 
government. One of the NASA engineers who started his work at NACA 
described the environment of laboratories as “more like working at a university 
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campus doing research.” The laboratory products were scientific and always one 
in-house. NACA researchers produced more than 16,000 technical papers before 
joining NASA. At that time, the only aeronautical research sources used in 
universities were NACA papers.  
Research was the nature of the tasks in NACA; consequently, 
NACA’s small laboratories were completely research-oriented. However, in the 
newly formed NASA space agency, tasks and missions began to change. Space 
flight supplanted aeronautical research as the primary task. NASA would 
construct rockets, spacecrafts, and satellites to reach the moon. Although the job 
changed, NASA’s basic approach or method to solving problems and completing 
tasks stayed the same. One year after NASA was established, management 
prepared a long-range plan stating: “During the coming ten years, NASA 
activities will involve extensive programs of engineering development and 
scientific research” (quoted by McCurdy, 1993, p. 29).  
The core of NASA was the old NACA research centers, and NASA 
space flight managers prepared for their tasks through extensive research and 
testing. The unknowns of the space environment created this need for extensive 
research and testing, but the care, particularly attention to safety, with which 
NASA employees did this work allowed the agency to feel confident about its 
activities.  As an example of this careful attitude toward research and testing, 
John Glenn, a NASA astronaut, spent 40 hours in formal briefings on the special 
features of Friendship 7, and more than 100 hours in the actual spacecraft during 
tests prior to his flight. In addition, he and his back-up pilot spent about 90 hours 
in the procedures trainer during which complete mission simulations were 
practiced (Webb, 1962, p. 5). Glenn commented that his first flight in space “was 
much less novel than might be supposed, because I had already experienced it a 
hundred times on the ground” (Webb, 1962, p. 5). NASA officials conducted 17 
unmanned flight tests of the Mercury capsule to see how it would work before 
John Glenn orbited the earth. One manager said “if we had needed more, we  
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would have flown more times” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 30). Regardless of the cost 
incurred by testing, learning, accumulation of knowledge, and safety were highly 
valued in NASA culture in the first period (1958–1972). 
The ABMA, the second biggest group in NASA, had approaches 
similar to NACA in their “way of doing” things. They did extensive research and 
testing to discover how rocket hardware worked. The German rocket team, the 
nucleus of the ABMA, did detailed, extensive testing and, whenever something 
broke, they redesigned it. Testing was highly valuable to employees because 
they had the opportunity to see what was working, what was not, and why.  As 
part of this “testing” culture, the German rocket team accepted some failures as 
“successful failures” and some as “complete failures” according to their own 
testing philosophy. If they experienced a failure in testing, and if it taught them 
something new, then they classified it as a successful failure. If they learned 
nothing from the failure, this was then a complete failure (Amy, 1990; McCurdy, 
1993). 
According to McCurdy (1993), the success in a research 
organization depends upon developing sophisticated testing and verification 
skills, and procedures. In other words, scientists and researchers must test their 
findings to continue to the next step in developing and accumulating skills. The 
following comment well articulates NASA’s focus on testing to carry out their 
tasks toward the end of the first period: “These had been the first steps in the 
process—a slow and methodical progression which increases the times in orbit 
and the amounts of data returned from the flights. The duplicating flights were 
planned and made to assure that more than luck or coincidence was involved” 
(America in Space, 1968, p. 24).  
Even when NASA began to contract out most of the work in 1962, 
its belief in extensive testing did not change. NASA employees did further testing 
even after receiving the testing and verification documents of manufacturers. 
Testing was first done on prototypes. When the actual production began, each 
individual component was tested again. Later, the complete product was tested 
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in the contractor’s manufacturing facilities. As an example, in the Apollo project, 
each part was tested separately, each subset of parts was tested, and the 
complete project was tested. Testing was elaborate and nothing was left to 
chance.  
b. In-house Technical Capability 
As stated earlier, NASA consisted of NACA, a large portion of 
ABMA, and a sizable number of Navy personnel from the Naval Research 
Laboratory. The trust and desire for in-house capability came from these pre-
existing organizations, which possessed substantial in-house technical capability 
to complete their small-size projects. More than 80 percent of NASA‘s technical 
core, namely engineers and scientists, were from these organizations in the first 
period (1958—1972).  They had their own in-house facilities to work on their 
research and projects before joining NASA (Launius, 1995). For example, The 
Langley Research Center was famous for its model-building shops. The Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) was an in-house government facility mostly working 
on developing satellites for the Navy and Department of Defense. The Vanguard 
project—America's first satellite program—was also carried out by NRL between 
1955 and 1959 and later was transferred to NASA. In addition, the first 
intelligence satellite of the nation, Grab I, was designed and built by NRL. The 
German rocket team, working first at the Redstone Arsenal and then the Marshall 
Space Center, was developing rocket hardware. They built the first Redstone 
rockets, which was used to launch the first American astronaut on a suborbital 
trajectory. In fact, the first 17 rockets were built at government facilities.  
The von Braun rocket team with considerable in-house capability 
also built the first eight Saturn I stages at the Huntsville facility. Even after work 
was contracted out, this team developed a general rule that 10 percent of the 




capability. Similarly, The Goddard Space Center, although it relied much on 
contractors for satellite development, always tried to produce at least one small 
satellite in their workshop. 
The belief that NASA must have in-house capability was for the 
following reasons: First, they thought in-house capability provided a training 
environment in which scientists and engineers can keep their hands on the jobs 
and sharpen their skills. Second, in-house capability can provide project flexibility 
by creating institutional memories. In case of a failure, available technical skills at 
hand could efficiently correct problems. Otherwise, looking for solutions outside 
the agency might delay projects since project members became scattered in the 
industry environment after the work was completed. Third, this capability could 
offer challenging tasks to talented engineers and scientists enabling them to be 
innovative, thereby reducing turnover by maintaining a satisfying job 
environment. Fourth, in-house capability was deemed important in monitoring 
and directing contractors’ work. Without it, project initiatives in terms of design, 
cost and schedule would be left to contractors. Finally, in-house capability was 
believed to protect and guarantee the agency’s future. NASA employees 
believed that their research and technical activities were the reasons the space 
agency existed. Consequently, they did not want to contract out all of its research 
and technical work.   If it did that, the agency would lose its core capability and 
become no more than a bookkeeping organization. 
This emphasis on technical competence, evaluation of work based 
solely on technical merits, and an in-house research environment comprised key 
aspects of NASA’s culture during its first period (1958–1972). 
c. Hands-on Experience 
The prior technical culture of NACA centers and the ABMA also 
placed high value on hands-on experience. The hands-on experience culture, 
like in-house capability, flourished in relatively small projects, which was the 
primary type of project size NACA’s centers engaged in. One of the leading 
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NASA engineers, formerly a NACA engineer, described the size and number of 
projects in NACA as: “The thing about the NACA was that there was a great 
number of very small projects current at any one time” (cited in McCurdy, 1993, 
p. 43).  As previously stated, in-house capability provided opportunity for hands-
on experience, and engineers and scientists had flexibility regarding what they 
wanted to do and how they were going to do their jobs, tasks or research projects 
with allotted funding (McCurdy, 1993). This flexibility seemed to encourage 
development of extensive technical skills, including first-hand experience. For 
example, NASA’s own astronauts flew the spacecrafts, and NASA employees sat 
at consoles at Mission Control and controlled and directed the flights.  
Hands-on experience, according to NASA employees, was also 
essential to monitor the work of contractors (McCurdy, 1993). NASA employees 
evidently believed that relying on their own experiences allowed them to 
effectively monitor the technical detail of contractors’ work, including requiring 
contractors do necessary project corrections according to the design, 
development and cost planned by NASA engineers. As an indication of the 
preservation of hands-on experience, six of twelve explorer satellites were built 
by the Goddard Space Center employees in their own facilities (McCurdy, 1993). 
Also, hands-on experiences of NASA employees helped the agency make a 
quick start on the lunar landing mission. For example, the engineers and scientist 
played a key role by providing technical knowledge to Apollo Project managers, 
enabling the managers to lead the contractors involved in the project efficiently. 
d. Risk and Failures as Part of Space Exploration 
NASA managers did not anticipate progress in space exploration 
without initial risk and failures. In addition, no one including the President, 
Congress and the nation expected NASA’s first steps in space to be completely 
error-free (Amy, 1990). The reason of anticipated risk and failures was that the 
space activities and environment were full of unknowns. Risk comes in many 
forms in human space travel, e.g., spacecraft engines can malfunction 
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unexpectedly. Electrical malfunctions or loss of spacecraft connectivity can 
happen possibly resulting in casualties. The Apollo program leader pointed out 
how NASA employees treated risks in space exploration: “Anybody that gets on 
the end of a flaming rocket and does not recognize the risks and dangers 
associated with it, does not understand the problem. We were well aware of the 
risks we were taking. On the other hand—and I emphasize this very, very 
carefully—we would never fly a manned vehicle if we knew something wrong with 
it until we fixed it. That is not to say that there were not some unknowns. That is 
not to say that we did not recognize the risk involved in the operation every damn 
time we went to pad.” And he concluded that “Recognition of risk is what made 
us as good as we were” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 62).  Knowledge of the space 
environment was not mature.  In other words, NASA did not have enough 
knowledge about what they were doing to avoid taking risks. NASA employees 
thought that even if they did everything they could to assure flight safety, they 
could not be completely sure about what would happen when they launched a 
spacecraft into orbit. A top manned space flight official clarified that “we were 
going to kill the astronauts in our Gemini flights by allowing them to stay up there 
more than one day—and going to Congress with a whole set of letters saying 
that” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 63).  Therefore, they accepted the possibility of even 
human causalities during space flights and training activities.  
Also, NACA’s and NASA’s prior experiences taught them failures 
even including human life were a necessary part of the process of space 
research in which lessons were learned, leading ultimately to success. For 
example, between 1948 and 1957, NACA and NASA lost three pilots in testing 
aircrafts. One of the leaders of the Apollo program said: “you did not learn except 
by failures. Now, you did not set out to kill people and you did not ever fly a 
machine in a flight regime where you did not have a reasonably good 
understanding of what the flight characteristics were going to be or the 
environment that you were going to fly in. But—and this is a very callous 
statement—we of the flight test business were acquainted with death” (McCurdy, 
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1993, p. 62). However, especially NASA’s manned flights were broadcasted in 
various media channels and were highly publicized (Amy, 1990). Consequently, 
tolerance for loss of life was different for test pilots than for astronauts due to the 
public eye constantly being on the astronauts. The space agency was risk-averse 
in order to not loose astronauts’ life in flights. Ultimately, the NASA astronauts 
who landed on the moon were elevated to “hero” status by the public, and were 
remembered as the most known figures of the space activities.  
NASA executives did not permit the bureaucratic tendency to avoid 
failure by denying that it could happen. Only by accepting the reality of failure 
could the organization deal effectively with it. In a similar approach, Webb (1962) 
stated that “safety culture” respected risk and failures only if all necessary 
precautions were taken: “We strive to maintain 100 percent reliability in manned 
space flight and to remove every danger and uncertainty that we can from this 
ever-hazardous undertaking” (p. 5).  
McCurdy (1993) pointed out that “the normalization of risk, the 
acceptance of risk, and the anticipation of trouble led to an atmosphere in which 
things could be discussed openly. NASA’s ability to handle risk required open 
discussion in which mid-level managers and engineers felt unrestrained in 
voicing warnings and dissents” (p. 65). This atmosphere, in fact, came from the 
technical culture of prior organizations. Everybody could express their opinion up 
and down the communication system. In NASA’s culture, open communication 
was paramount, and failures were seen as part of making progress in space 
activity. For example, one of the agency’s top spacecraft engineers described the 
communication environment of NASA, which had its roots in the technical 
cultures of NASA’s predecessor organizations, as: “There was a great deal of 
democracy in the management. Everybody…was free to state their feelings. No 
one was treated any different if he objected to what management would think 
than if he praised what management would think. Management did not look for 
praise. They looked for anybody with good advice” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 65). To 
weigh all options, managers of NASA relied on dissenting views. Employees felt 
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unrestrained in voicing warnings and dissent. Thus, NASA’s ability to handle risk 
and prevent unnecessary failures appeared to be optimized through an open 
communication environment. 
In sum, NASA’s culture saw failure as part of the space process, 
while at the same time trying to eliminate failures by creating an open-
communication environment. This attitude helped NASA to accumulate 
knowledge step by step, and to eventually achieve success. 
e. Frontier Mentality 
A frontier mentality is meant to describe an essential aspect of 
NASA’s technical culture. Frontier mentality refers to the desire to embark on 
new challenges, to make new discoveries, to try something harder each time, to 
invent and build new things, and to test and investigate new things. In short, it is 
about expanding technical and scientific knowledge and skills to purposefully 
seek and solve new problems and challenges. Engineers and scientists before 
NASA and during the first period of NASA (1958—1972) had ample opportunities 
to keep the idea of exploring new frontiers alive. 
The knowledge and the skills needed to conduct space exploration 
were sorely lacking before NASA was established. This limited knowledge about 
space flight helped employees to bring this frontier mentality to NASA. With 
NASA, various projects such as Gemini, Mercury, and Apollo allowed engineers 
and scientists to further cultivate this frontier mentality, since each project 
challenged them by presenting new difficulties. Since space exploration is full of 
new opportunities, the frontier mentality in NASA’s culture was always kept alive 
during the first period of NASA (1958–1972). 
f. Hiring Exceptional People 
NASA believed that the only way to accomplish the most 
challenging task they had ever faced was to have an exceptional work force. The 
prior organizations included in NASA such as NACA and ABMA had already 
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started their space research activities with talented engineers and scientists. 
NACA was able to attract personnel with exceptional skills by offering them the 
freedom to do interesting research. 
Freedom was important for skillful researchers in that it enabled 
them to better sharpen their knowledge and experience by minimizing 
constraints. Also, the fame of NACA and its laboratories as a research-oriented 
institution in the United States helped them to attract employees with the best 
skills. The von Braun team and the 200 engineers who moved to the Goddard 
Space Centers had the finest engineering skills in the United States (McCurdy, 
1993). 
NASA also did not change this tradition and adopted the culture of 
hiring employees with the best available skills. Also, the challenge and mystery of 
the historical moon landing mandate motivated talented people from universities, 
industry, and government to join NASA. These talented people thought they 
could help make history and thus would be able to write their names in people’s 
memory by being a part of a project that put a man on the moon (McCurdy, 1993; 
Launius, 1995). 
Among the other factors that enabled NASA to recruit employees 
with exceptional skills was the elimination of constraints put on hiring managers 
by the central personnel agency. NASA was allowed to create around 700 
positions, which were excluded from the ordinary personnel management 
bureaucracies, and had the flexibility to pay competitive salaries to the 
employees in these positions (Levine, 1982). In addition, NASA recruited large 
numbers of people to carry out the challenging moon landing task and allowed 
these people to move between NASA and private industries and universities 
whenever they wanted, which was the opposite of other governmental agencies’ 
practices. This flexibility created a young, ambitious, and skillful workforce for the 
agency. As a result, the turnover rate during the 1960s was more than two times 
that of the 1970s, and the average age of the employees was 38 in the mid-
1960’s, which was the lowest average in the agency’s history (McCurdy, 1993). 
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Young people brought new ideas, new capabilities, and new ways 
of working to NASA. They were also not influenced by agency politics and past 
failures. Most importantly, they were ambitious. They worked long hours which 
strengthened the hard-work culture of the agency. Furthermore, the exceptional 
performance of the young people contributed to the can-do attitude of the 
agency. 
During the first period (1958–1972) all of the above-mentioned 
cultural traits of NASA such as extensive research and testing, in-house technical 
capability, hands-on experience, seeing risk and failures as part of space 
exploration, hiring exceptional employees, and the frontier mentality were 
transferred from prior organizations. These cultural traits played an important role 
in the performance of the organization and were developed and adopted over the 
years after successful completion of research projects and technical jobs.  
However, this did not mean that when these cultural traits were passed on to 
NASA they guaranteed NASA’s success. It’s important to look at the alignment of 
these cultural traits with NASA tasks and with the people, resources, and its 
structure to see potential performance impacts. If the culture and these crucial 
organizational components were incongruent, then dysfunctional effects can 
result (O’Reilly & Tushman, 1997). 
B. ALIGNMENT OF NASA CULTURE WITH TASK, PEOPLE, 
RESOURCES, AND STRUCTURE  
1. Task 
In the formation and early growth of NASA, U.S. Presidents mission 
taskings appeared straightforward. In the first two and a half years, during the 
Eisenhower administration, NASA was simply not capable of manned space 
flight. Thus, the only manned space flight mission for which the agency received 
authorization was the relatively small Project Mercury, intended to sustain a 
single astronaut in low Earth orbit for one day (McCurdy, 1993). President 
Eisenhower’s space program placed great emphasis on satellite technology and 
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deemphasized the role of humans in space (Lauinus, 1995). He continually 
disapproved any manned space flight program that went beyond the single-seat 
Mercury capsule, which he evidently believed was a precursor for determining 
human space travel.  
President Eisenhower indicated that the value the country could get from 
scientific investigations conducted on Earth outweighed the value that could be 
obtained from discoveries in space. According to President Eisenhower, the U. S. 
was leading the scientific field, while the Soviet Union led the engineering field; 
consequently, there was no need for a race to explore space. He clearly stated 
these points after leaving the White House by saying, “Why the great hurry to get 
to the moon and the planets? We have already demonstrated that in everything 
except the power of our booster rockets we are leading the work in scientific 
explorations. From here on, I think we should proceed in an orderly, scientific 
way, building one accomplishment on another, rather than engaging in a mad 
effort to win a stunt race” (cited in Launius, 1995, p. 37). But, there was a heated 
debate in Washington regarding the direction of NASA. As a result, the long-
range direction of NASA’s space flight program remained uncertain until 1961.  
With the inauguration of John F. Kennedy, a new and bright era began for 
NASA. President Kennedy was in favor of an assertive, large-scale, and far-
reaching manned space program. He provided an extremely challenging goal for 
NASA by delivering an inspirational visionary statement: “I believe that this nation 
should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth,” before a joint session of 
Congress on May 25, 1961.7   
President Kennedy evidently believed that science and technology could 
solve almost any societal problem, i.e., a stated trust in the power of science and 
technology. That belief helped spark his 1961 decision to go to the moon 
(Launius, 1995). Another reason for the moon mission was created by the Cold 
                                            
7 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History Office, 
http://history.nasa.gov/moondec.html accessed October 2007. 
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War atmosphere in which the space race became a primary metaphor for 
superpower status. The Soviet Union had already launched the Sputnik I 
satellite, and many U.S. policy makers thought the Russians might use  space for 
military purposes. James Killian (1977) described the effect of Sputnik I 
launching: “Sputnik I created a crisis of confidence that swept the country like a 
windblown forest fire. Overnight there developed a widespread belief that the 
country lay at the mercy of the Russian military machine and that our government 
and its military arm had abruptly lost the power to defend the homeland itself, 
much less to maintain U.S prestige and leadership in the international arena”  
(p. 7).  
Public attention also began to focus on the relationship between Cold War 
dominance and the space race. “Control of space means control of the world,” 
said Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson to his colleagues in 1958 (Launius, 
1995, p. 41).  According to Werner von Braun, the head of the army rocket team, 
“there will also be another possible use for the space station. It can be converted 
into a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier” (Lauinus, 1995, p. 43). 
With the mission of dispatching Americans to the moon, NASA developed 
the Apollo project. According to a NASA document, “Apollo provided an easily 
identifiable target as a focus for the energies of hundreds of thousands of 
scientists, engineers, technicians, craftsmen, and administrators in both 
government and private industry who were engaged in the program” (This is 
NASA, 1969, p. 6). James Webb (1962), the second administrator of NASA, 
compactly stated NASA’s goal for the 1960s when he said, “We are moving 
toward achievement of our national goal of mastering the space environment and 
attaining, as the President urged, ‘a position second to none’” (p. 3). America, as 
the President urged, would be the leading nation in space and would establish its 
superiority in science and technology through space exploration. 
To accomplish this task, NASA began to develop further technical, 
scientific and engineering skills and knowledge. Step by step, NASA mobilized its 
resources toward moon landing. According to NASA, “tracing the road to Apollo 
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could be like tracing the steps of man’s scientific and engineering achievements 
since he discovered fire and invented the wheel” (America in Space, 1968, p. 5).  
Webb emphasized the challenge of space exploration by indicating its 
requirements as “the accumulation of knowledge, skill, and experience [that] 
must precede ultimate achievement in any undertaking, with the failures as well 
as successes providing the foundation for eventual victory” (Webb, 1962, p. 10).  
The cooperation and interaction among centers appeared to improve with 
this new, complex, and interrelated task. In the Apollo project, “a number of co-
equal centers were responsible for various program segments. Only 
headquarters had the overview and took upon itself the responsibility for 
coordination” (Chandeler & Sayes, 1971, p. 177). There were also a multitude of 
inter-center “panels” and interface “boards” that brought together all the parties 
interested in a specific project problem. Also, for the Apollo project, a central 
Apollo Program Management Office was established in Washington to control 
and coordinate the works of field centers. This management office charged the 
Marshal Space Center with developing the launch vehicles; made the Johnson 
Spacecraft Center responsible for the development of the spacecraft, astronauts 
training, and the control of the mission in progress; and gave the Kennedy Space 
Center responsibility for assembling, checking out and launching the spacecraft.  
Apollo’s task or moon landing required high engineering and scientific 
skills to design long-range rockets, powerful engines, sophisticated 
communication systems, command modules, and so forth. As indicated earlier, 
NASA had a technical and research culture which it adopted from the parts of 
prior organizations that were integrated into NASA. Furthermore, the agency’s 
frontier culture encouraged employees to do things that had not been done 
before.  The culture of engineers is to “invent and build, make it work, watch it 
work, and then go up and invent, build and watch something else work” 
(McCurdy, 1993, p. 73). Apollo’s new challenges reportedly kept people alert and 
prevented complacency. In a culture that accepts risk and failure, people were  
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encouraged to bring forward problems and errors. Such an attitude seemed 
highly conducive for employees to do outstanding work, and that attitude was an 
integration of NASA’s different occupational cultures. 
The Apollo program was large and complex which required the bulk of the 
work to be contracted out. Hence, it required high-quality project management 
skills which were the weakest aspect of NASA’s culture at that time (Kloman, 
1985) since the culture inherited from prior organizations highly valued in-house 
capability. The Air Force managers NASA brought in to serve as program 
managers commented that “NASA had a considerable technical depth, but 
almost no program management experience” to work with industry on large 
programs (McCurdy, 1993, p. 92).  
Much of the work of the Gemini and Apollo projects were completed with 
substantial contractor assistance. By bringing experienced, highly skilled 
contracting and program management Air Force personnel to NASA’s Apollo 
program management, the agency strengthened this weakness which may have 
been crucial for putting a man on the moon. NASA’s technical culture appeared 
to take the initiative in contracting, in that it did not contract out all the Apollo 
work. It kept a sufficient amount of work inside so employees could have hands-
on experience and the agency could maintain in-house capability. Therefore, the 
hands-on experience and in-house employee capability appeared instrumental in 
controlling contracted-out technical details and design decisions. Engineers and 
scientists provided program managers with the array of technical information 
needed for effective project management. 
In sum, the Apollo project needed many contractors and needed them to 
be well-managed, such that contractors and NASA employees could jointly 
design and develop sophisticated and capable spacecraft systems under time 
pressures. NASA’s technical and research culture from prior organizations 
appeared to develop the necessary program management attributes, perhaps 
driven by experienced Air force managers. This fit or alignment between 
technical/research capabilities and program management capabilities is key to 
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understanding the topic of this study.  Variables interacted in such a way as to 
create a dominant organizational culture, which successfully accomplished the 
entire moon landing challenge within the envisioned decade. 
2. People 
As designers and builders of organizations for thousands of years, people 
can arguably be described as the most important variable. The general premise 
is that the right strategy and the right product can perform only with capable 
people working towards a common purpose.  The variable, which may therefore 
have the greatest impact on performance, is a belief system – a culture – that 
guides human decision making for thousands of organizational employees.  The 
closer the fit of interacting components, the more focused and diligent the 
accompanying culture.. Obviously, senior leaders and managers have some 
discretion over who is hired, and who is promoted or let go.  If an organization 
continues to make decisions, which strengthen its cultural attributes, then the 
probability of high performance increases.  One secret to NASA’s exceptional 
success in the first period (1958–1972) was its “exceptional” people (Launius, 
1995; Levine, 1982; McCurdy, 1993). 
NASA had a culture of seriously hiring qualified and motivated employees. 
To expand upon the notion that NASA was really a combination or infusing of 
four prior organizations—NACA, ABMA, JPL and NRL. The predecessor 
organizations themselves were already focused on recruiting outstanding people. 
One NASA official commented about the people of NACA: “The NACA basically 
hired the cream of the crop from colleges—the intellectuals—because they had a 
reputation for that” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 51). NACA mostly employed engineers 
and scientists from the best universities such as the University of California, 
Stanford, and the University of Washington.  
The Naval Research Laboratory highly skilled employees comprised the 
nucleus of the Goddard Space Centers. One of the officials in this center 
described the level of knowledge of employees as: “…I did not realize it when I 
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started out, but found out very quickly that I had got about 50 percent of the 
people of the United States that knew everything about satellites” (McCurdy, 
1993, p. 52). Similarly, the ABMA with its rocket team had the best talent. 
NASA had a limited knowledge and experience about the space 
environment in 1958, and now it was directly competing with the Soviet Union 
superpower.  The launching of Russia’s Sputnik and the goal of lunar landing 
before 1970 created in NASA scientists and employees a tsunami of creative and 
competitive tension. “From the outset, space administration heads [NASA 
management] determined that the agency must build and maintain an 
exceptionally strong technical competence within its own laboratories” (Seipert, 
1962, p. 60). In other words, the performance of the American Space Program 
was based on the view that NASA could overcome the difficulties of space 
exploration with a work force composed of professional engineers and scientists. 
This was one of the most persistent beliefs in the early NASA culture and 
remained so during the first period (1958–1972). 
NASA could hire the most talented people from universities, private 
industry and other parts of the government for the following reasons: First, the 
challenge of the work motivated people to join the agency. The work of 
developing an airplane was attractive and challenging during the time of NACA.  
Similarly, the task of reaching the moon before 1970 was also a visionary yet 
reachable challenge for NASA employees.  
Manned Space Fight consisted of Mercury, Gemini and Apollo projects in 
the 1960s. Completion of the Mercury and Gemini projects and the initial stages 
of the Apollo project positioned NASA to be more capable of landing a man on 
the moon by the end of the decade. Certainly, each project created new 
challenges and difficulties, which appeared to act as an even greater motivational 
stimulus for the scientists and engineers involved.  
It is reasonable to offer that the challenges and successes of the moon 
landing task could have only been accomplished through a committed and 
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competent work force. NASA attracted and hired skillful engineers and scientists 
through its technical culture in which engineers and scientists felt they could be 
both productive and innovative. The culture of the agency allowed employees to 
enrich their skills, work ambitiously, and to learn from their mistakes. To put it 
another way, a strong technical core of employees reflected NASA’s dominant 
culture. Furthermore, ample hands-on experience, a focus on research and 
testing, and a frontier attitude contributed to an organizational climate where 
people had the tools, ability and motivation to excel in their work. Recall that this 
culture appeared to normalize risk, and to work with, and not against mistakes 
and failures, all in the context of an open-communication environment. Evidently, 
engineers were allowed to be engineers, including a built-in reliance on 
quantifiable data.  
Some say the space race was very much a part of the Cold War. People 
who wanted to make a contribution to their country saw NASA as America doing 
what it did best – accomplishing big, bold projects, i.e., winning WWII, building 
the Suez canal and a national highway system, and surpassing the Soviet Union 
and attaining the moon in one stroke. Of course, the ability to pay competitive 
salaries to top scientists and engineers helped.  NASA did experience early 
difficulties obtaining enough specialists to carry out such an innovative, complex 
and demanding task.  
President Kennedy passed the Federal Salary Reform Act in 1962 
providing government agencies the ability to pay their employees comparable 
salaries with the private sector. This act provided NASA the leverage it needed to 
compete effectively in the bid for talent, and appeared to once again provide a fit 
of variables needed to ensure resulting performance, i.e., qualified people fitting 
the knowledge requirements of successful space travel. Rossiter (1992) indicated 
that the act was approved specifically to enable NASA to quickly and fully obtain 
the crucial component of a large, complex and highly qualified workforce. Finally, 
as mentioned earlier, the rapid expansion of the space program with the moon 
landing task and the relative ease of securing needed professionals contributed 
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to the “can-do” attitude descriptive of NASA’s overall culture. Seipert (1962) 
demonstrated this point when he said, “NASA’s technical and managerial staffs 
have developed an amazing stamina for long hours of work under great 
pressure” (p. 69). NASA executives often expressed pride in their people. The 
administrator, Webb (1968), showed his belief and confidence when he said, 
“NASA has the strongest team that it has ever had” (p. 8). The “America in 
Space” document agreed with Webb and amplified this point: “This agency brings 
the best technical minds in the world together to perform spectacular feats” 
(America in Space, 1968, p. 23). 
Also relevant was a positive virtuous cycle.  Hiring thousands of 
competitive people with strong, ambitious drive makes any organization appear 
stronger, thereby attracting even more highly qualified and exceptional people. 
As in the Southwest Airline example in Chapter II, NASA also appeared to focus 
steadfastly on recruiting and selecting people which best fit its continually 
productive culture. The government authorized the agency to choose its 
employees through a special exam, which was for NASA’s use alone (Levine, 
1982). What made the examination unique was that the applicant, in addition to 
the required educational background, had to demonstrate “understanding of 
research and development organizations and their specialized problems, 
organizational structures, functions, operations, and characteristics” (Levine, 
1982, p. 117). This unique testing procedure, combined with the above-
mentioned factors, gave NASA considerable control over hiring decisions.  
Clearly, one of the strongest components of NASA during the first period 
(1958—1972) was its workforce. This workforce and the processes used to 
ensure a fit and strengthening of desired cultural attributes complemented and 
defined NASA’s cultural core. This alignment of people, task, processes and 
culture epitomizes the central theme of this study, that the interrelationships and 
fit of the variables determines performance. 
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3. Resources 
The external environment has constraints and opportunities for 
organizations that depend on the external environment for resources. Changes in 
environmental conditions increase or limit the capability of organizations to obtain 
resources. Favorable changes in the environment are opportunities which affect 
culture positively. Unfavorable changes are constraints and will affect culture 
negatively. Organizations will then be forced by pressures to adapt as a result of   
changes in the environment. This adaptation also includes cultural change 
(Davis, 1982; Meek, 1988).  Also, in Schein’s definition of organizational culture 
(1990) in chapter 1, organizational culture is a tool used to cope with the external 
environment. His definition refers to external forces such as technological, 
physical, and cultural environment which have impact on culture. Schein (2004) 
further explained that “the environment initially determines the possibilities, 
options, and constraints for a group, and thus forces a group to specify its 
primary task or function if it is to survive at all. The environment thus initially 
influences the formation of the culture, but once culture is present in the sense of 
shared assumptions, those assumptions, in turn, influence what will be perceived 
and defined as the environment” (p. 51). 
Specifically, NASA’s primary resources included a sufficient budget, wide-
ranging facilities and technical equipment, industry involvement and people. The 
psychological support of the nation can also be included in the resource category 
because the agenda of the President and Congress, who funded NASA, are 
partly determined by the nation’s interest. As an example, when the nation gave 
great support to the agency in the 1960s, the funds NASA received were much 
greater than the funds it received in the 1970s. When the nation turned its 
attention after the moon landing to domestic problems such as deteriorating 
economic conditions and the effects of the Vietnam War, the interest of the 
President and Congress shifted from NASA to rebuilding economic conditions 
and ending the Vietnam War (Amy, 1990). Although there are four parts to the  
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resource category—financial, industry, people, facilities and equipment, the focus 
of this discussion is on financial and industry resources, because, people, 
facilities and equipment were discussed earlier in the chapter.  
 NASA as a government organization was impacted directly by external 
environmental forces including the role of industry. NASA was extremely 
dependent on industry because contracting had become a primary tool for 
accomplishing its complex tasks and objectives. In sum, NASA was performing 
most of its work through contracts. For example, around 90 percent of 
appropriations of NASA in fiscal year 1963 were spent on contracts. This rate 
remained roughly the same throughout its first era, 1958–1972 (NASA—Industry 
Conference, 1963). To spend the money efficiently and manage the projects 
successfully, each center within NASA was given the authority to award contracts 
for the project assigned to it, subject to approval by NASA headquarters. For 
example, the Marshal Space Center contracted with the Boeing Company, Space 
Division of North American Aviation, Inc. and Douglas Aircraft Company for 
engines and the stages of the Saturn space vehicle. The Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory was operated for NASA by the California Institute of Technology 
under a cost-type contract, and it too did a substantial amount of contracting.  
The culture of NASA, however, placed high value on in-house capability 
since extensive contracting was not part of the technical culture that NASA 
inherited from the prior organizations. Although NASA originally valued in-house 
capabilities, resources were constrained, time was limited, and tasks and 
objectives were large and complex.  Therefore, it had to outsource large parts of 
projects. To avoid cultural conflict between in-house work and contracting out, 
the agency, as mentioned earlier, kept a sufficient amount of work in-house to 
allow engineers and scientists at least conceptually to monitor and to some 
extent control contractors’ work.  
The work kept inside the agency left plenty of room for in-house work 
traditions. For example, although NASA centers contracted out a substantial 
amount of construction work, much of the construction work at Cape Canaveral, 
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the Mississippi test site, and the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston was 
being done by NASA’s engineers (NASA—Industry Conference, 1963). Thus, the 
culture aligned itself by keeping sufficient amount of work in-house and by only 
contracting out the work its people were unable to perform. This balance 
between in-house and contract work enabled NASA to maintain its in-house 
capability cultural component. 
In addition, NASA was hiring talented employees from private companies, 
universities and other government organizations.  NASA could compete with 
private industry for badly needed “human resources” because of its culture.  As 
stated earlier, NASA was an “engineer-in-charge” organization which was 
providing employees hands-on experience, challenging tasks, tolerance for 
mistakes and learning in an open-communication environment. NACA employed 
8,000 employees when dissolved in 1958. NASA’s in-house employment peaked 
at about 36,000 in 1967, an increase of 450 percent compared to 1958. During 
NASA’s first year, approximately one third of its 8,000 employees were scientist 
and engineers. By 1968 nearly half of its 35,000 employees were scientists and 
engineers. The increase in numbers of employees shows industry and 
universities had a sufficient amount of scientific and engineering talent and, most 
importantly, NASA could attract people from these professional labor sources.   
The second external force that affected NASA’s culture was the President 
and Congress. As a government agency, NASA’s financial resources were 
allocated by the President and Congress. As stated above, the financial 
resources NASA received changed from period to period according to 
Congressional, Presidential and national priorities. During most of the first period 
(1958–1972) NASA received the financial support it needed to complete its 
projects. These financial resources enabled NASA to flourish by enabling it to 
maintain its unique cultural characteristics.  In the early years of the first period 
(1958–1961) during Eisenhower’s administration, the space program was kept 
relatively small and NASA’s budget was limited. NASA received $ 369 million in 
1959 and $ 485 million in 1960. The amount of budget in these two years was a 
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little higher than that of NACA (Table 1). However, President Kennedy persuaded 
the nation and Congress to engage in large-scale space activity, and thereby 
created an environment of significant support for NASA. Moreover, since NASA’s 
goal of being first in space was presented as a way to prove the superiority of 
Democracy over Communism, support for the agency continued through Apollo 
13’s moon landing. One of the administrators of NASA in the early years, T. Keith 
Glennan, summarized this extraordinary level of support by saying that “congress 
always wanted to give us more money….Only a blundering fool could go up to 
the Hill and come back with a result detrimental to the agency” (Launius, 1995, p. 
17). Another document, Space Quotes (1969), shows this unprecedented 
support by noting: “Never before has a free society mobilized its resources with 
such energy with only peace and pure knowledge as objectives” (p. 3). Figure 6 






















































Figure 6.   NASA’s Budget (1959–1972) (After: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, NASA History Division, http://history.nasa.gov/SP-
4012/vo13/table1.2htm, (accessed October 2007)). 
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NASA's budget increased ten fold, from $500 million to $5.2 billion in the 
five years between 1960 and 1965. The budget began to decrease after 1965, 
since NASA completed major Apollo research and development tasks and much 
of the hardware needed for the lunar mission had already been procured by 
1965. Although Congress started cutting the space agency's annual budget,8 
there were no major discrepancies between NASA’s requests and the amount of 
money allocated by Congress in the first  period (1958–1972). For example, 
NASA requested $ 5.26 billion in 1966 and $ 5.19 billion was allocated, i.e., 
NASA received over 95 percent of its budget requests. This rate was one of the 
highest among government agencies.  
All in all, the agency was allocated sufficient budget to continue its 
program of scientific and engineering development required to complete the 
moon mission. With the positive effect of funding, NASA continued to do 
systematic research, testing, and design resulting in a step by step accumulation 
of knowledge. 
4. Structure 
As discussed in Chapter II, culture is a complex topic. Similarly, structure is 
complex. Although organizational charts are used to show the structure of an 
organization, it is very hard to say that it is an adequate description of what really 
takes places inside the organization. Many important power and communication 
relationships which are in the organizations are not put down on paper. One of 
the best examples was given by Mintzberg (1979): “A map is invaluable for 
finding towns and their connecting roads, but it tells nothing about the economic 
and social relationship of the region” (p. 37).  
 
                                            
8 For more information, see National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History 
Division,  http://history.NASA.gov/SP-4012/vol3/ch1.htm, (accessed October 2007). 
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Baligh (1994), one of the few researchers studying on structure and 
culture relationship, hypothesized to find out the alignment between structure and 
culture that if a culture: (1) values altruism over selfishness (the group more 
highly than the individual), (2) believes that cooperation is more efficient than 
competition in achieving group goals, (3) believes that harmony in personal 
relations is best at getting cooperation, then the organization structure that fits it 
at a high level has: (a) very high level of participation by all members of the group 
in making the decision rules for every member, (b) decision rules made by 
consensus, (c) decision rules that are medium in level of fineness, (d) decision 
rules that are high in level of comprehensiveness, (e) rewards to each individual 
based mostly on group performance or its outcome, (f) rewards to each individual 
based slightly on his performance relative to the decision rules he is given to use 
(p. 24). 
His conclusion is that trying to analyze the fit between an entire culture 
and an entire organization structure is not conclusive. However, he proposed the 
analysis be in terms one or a few attributes of culture with one or a few attributes 
of the structure. For example, the flat structure of universities with chairs and 
deans as managers having a large span of control and important decision 
making occurring at the lower levels of the organization, such as faculty 
members, helps to create or reinforce a culture of autonomy, choice, and career 
self management. 
Keeping above-mentioned points in mind, we will find out which structural 
configuration NASA had in the first period and analyze the alignment between 
cultural variables explained earlier and its structure. As already discussed in 
chapter III, although the relationship between structure and culture is not clear 
enough to examine, its final impact is on the performance of the agency. Hence, 
the right criteria to measure the degree of fit should be the performance of NASA 
which culminated with the moon landing. 
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The NASA structure changed frequently to enable the agency to maintain 
flexibility, which was one of the most important aspects of NASA culture, and to 
adapt to changes in tasks. The complexities of jurisdictions, the network of 
informal relations, the shifting of functions between offices, and the blurring of the 
lines of authority caused NASA to reorganize four times—in January 1961, 
November 1961, November 1963, and May 1968 (Levine, 1982). These 
reorganizations can also be seen as an effort to create the suitable structure 
which supports “the way employees do things.” 
NASA divided space activities into groups in 1961. This division was 
unavoidable because early organizations (i.e. Ames, Langley, and Lewis 
Laboratories) had developed skills in one specific area. Hence, division of labor 
had to be done when NASA was first established.  Accordingly, each center was 
given a specific task. As mentioned earlier, the manned space flights were given 
to the Johnson Space Center, the launching task to the Kennedy Space Center, 
the testing of hardware such as spacecraft to the Stennis Space Center, and the 
unmanned flights to the Goddard Space Center and the Marshal Space Center. 
These field centers and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory were considered 
principally as development centers. The formerly NACA—operated laboratories, 
namely Langley, Ames, and Lewis, were focused on advanced research and 
technology studies. These laboratories were thought of as research centers, and 
they continued to do their same jobs under NASA. Figure 7 shows the simplified 







































Figure 7.   Simplified Organizational Chart of NASA (From: Chandler & Sayles 
(1971)) 
The above division of activities and the centers’ geographically isolated 
locations provided them with flexibility and autonomy even when thousands of 
new civilian personnel were hired, on-site contractor personnel started work at 
the centers. Congress appropriated significant financial resources, Congress and 
the nation had extremely high performance expectations.  The autonomy of field 
centers increased while working on the Gemini and Mercury projects. The 
division of labor allowed for decentralized decision making. The decisions in each 
center were made based on the best technical knowledge and judgment. 
Conflicts were resolved through open discussion. Engineers and scientists were 
able to voice their views while participating in the decision-making process. In 
addition, the communication channels were open in both upward and downward 
directions. In short, engineers and scientists were allowed to control their 
projects. They decided what to do and how to do it.  
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The huge autonomy, large span of control and flexibility in project 
management in the agency sometimes frightened NASA administrators (Levin, 
1982). James Webb, the second NASA administrator, worried that the space 
agency’s field centers would “go into business for themselves” (Young, 1986, p. 
37-38). Even though he had this fear, it did not happen because NASA 
reorganized itself for the Apollo project. Although this project was centrally 
managed, the culture of NASA which valued flexibility, autonomy and expertise in 
doing work was also prevalent in carrying out the project. The management of 
NASA located in Washington appointed General Samuel Phillips as the overall 
Apollo program director and placed him in the central office in Washington. He 
was given the choice of hiring his own contractors without competitive bidding to 
perform overall system engineering and integration work. The field centers which 
had the primary responsibility for the moon landing task reported directly to 
Phillips (McCurdy, 1993). This restructuring with the result that project autonomy 
resided with the Apollo program director demonstrates that the flexible, can-do 
culture of the agency affected the restructuring and implementation of Apollo by 
energizing management and centers to take every necessary step toward the 
accomplishment of the mission.  
According to Minztberg (1979), aerospace, petrochemicals, think-tank 
consulting, and film-making organizations should be structured as adhocracies.   
The common points of all of these organizations are innovations that need to be 
done in complex ways are typically accomplished by “mutual adjustment through 
the informal communication and interaction of competent experts” (p. 111). 
Obviously, NASA constantly needed to innovate to beat the Russians to the 
moon.  
Adhocracy has both operating and administrative forms. The operating 
adhocracy carries out projects under contract on behalf of its clients. An 
advertising agency, a think-tank consulting firm, and a manufacturer of 
engineering prototypes are examples of this type. The administrative adhocracy 
undertakes projects on its own behalf. The industries in which they operate 
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require “project structures” that take experts from different specialties and merge 
them into smoothly functioning innovative teams. Therefore, adhocracy is the 
structure designed for effective functioning of project teams.  
NASA as a space agency was a perfect example of an “administrative 
adhocracy” in the Apollo era  (1962–1972) (Chandler & Sayles, 1971).  First, the 
administrative adhocracy tends to concentrate its attention on fewer projects, 
which involve more people in interdependent relationships. For example, through 
the 1960s, NASA focused on the single goal of putting a man on the moon before 
1970. NASA’s Apollo project involved most of its personnel for 10 years. When 
the project ended, the employees working for NASA with contracts became 
scattered throughout the industry.  
Second, adhocracy is a fluid structure in which power, coordination and 
control are constantly shifting. It relies on trained and specialized experts to get 
the bulk of its work done. Experts work together to create new knowledge and 
complex technologies, e.g., a lunar lander. Hence, for coordination adhocracy 
relies on mutual adjustment, which it encourages by the use of liaison devices—
integrating managers, task forces, and matrix structure. Experts are dispersed 
throughout the structure according to the decisions they make. So, the power is 
distributed unevenly. It flows to wherever the expertise is needed for a particular 
decision. For example, according to Chandler & Sayles (1971) “While there may 
be a number of permanent operations in such projects, much of the work is 
temporary. People get shifted around and plans get changed in an environment 
quite different from the tiresome monotony bemoaned by so many in traditional 
institutions. Projects, task forces, and temporary “teams” also mean that 
individuals have multiple organizational “homes.” A scientist may be a part of a 
university, responsible for the design and testing of an experiment to be flown by 
a NASA spacecraft, serving as a consultant to an industrial contractor that builds 
equipment for the agency, and a member of an advisory board that helps shape 
future science policy for NASA and other governmental agencies (p. 6).  
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Functional, integrating, and project managers play important roles in an 
adhocracy. Their roles, though, are different from the roles of managers in other 
structures. They do not directly supervise the members of the team. They behave 
more like other team members, with their primary task being to link different 
teams necessary to accomplish the work. The primary role of top management in 
an adhocracy is that of a liaison with external stakeholders. Chandler and Sayes 
(1971) noted that NASA’s top management had the role maintaining “external 
relations with various units of the Executive Branch, with Congress, and with key 
public groups representing private universities, business, the scientific 
community, and various international interests” (p. 173).  
In a project structure, power is based on expertise, and organizational 
strategy is everybody’s work, not just that of the top managers. In other words, 
strategy is developed by the involvement of multiple levels of experts (Mintzberg, 
1979). For example, Chandler and Sayles (1971) noted  during NASA’s Apollo 
project period that  “…while it is clear who has the authority to make, and who 
announces, the final decision (the top administrator of NASA), it is much more 
difficult to say who, in fact, makes the decision. It is the product of a complex 
process of interaction and confrontation in which technical, administrative and 
broader political criteria are applied and in which both technical and managerial 
personnel participate…. Decision-making is a process in which various 
organizational levels and interest groups compete for position in a sequence and 
to make their voice the strongest” (pp. 174–176). 
According to Toffler (1970), adhocracies “change their internal shape with 
frequency—and sometimes harshness—that makes the head swim. Titles 
change from week to week. Jobs are transformed. Responsibilities shift. Vast 
organizational structures are taken apart, bolted together again in new forms, 
then rearranged again. Departments and divisions spring up overnight only to 
vanish in another, and yet another reorganization” (p. 128). For example, the 
Manned Space Flight Center of NASA changed its structure 17 times in the first 
eight years of its existence (Litzinger, Mayrinac & Wagle, 1971, p. 7). The reason 
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for frequent changes in the structure of NASA’s Manned Space Flight is that it 
lacked the advantages of those that do repetitive work. Since project work is 
usually “being the first done for the first time…precedents and policies are 
somewhat irrelevant” and “it is difficult to draw neat jurisdictional lines” (Chandler 
& Sayles, 1971, p. 202). 
Finally, in an adhocracy structure, information and decision processes flow 
flexibly and informally, wherever they must to promote innovation. And, 
innovation requires creating new knowledge or skills by enabling people with 
novel, fresh perspectives to generate ideas or by integrating information from 
ever-changing groupings of people. Relying on the standardized skills of experts 
rarely leads to innovation. For example, “An electrical specialist can spot a 
mechanical problem, perhaps in part because he does not know the conventional 
wisdom, and a bright engineer working in an apparently unrelated field can come 
up with a solution to a problem that has been frustrating the functional 
specialists” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 434). One NASA executive commented about 
the information flow in NASA: “to be on the safe side, NASA may err in over 
communicating upward, laterally, and downward. It engulfs anyone who can 
conceivably influence or implement the decision. It establishes various 
management councils composed of co-equal associates to share progress and 
problems on a frequent basis. In an unending effort to exchange information in 
real time, it uses telephone, hot lines, executive aircraft, data fax, long distance 
conference hook-ups by voice and data display and computer data 
transmissions” (Chandler & Sayles, 1971, p. 20). 
The previous points clearly indicated that NASA structured itself as an 
adhocracy. Obviously putting a man on the moon proved to be a very complex 
task, requiring the coordinated knowledge and expertise of a multitude of 
society’s most talented scientists and engineers. Moreover, the task was 
unpredictable—having never been tried before—and rendered more dynamic by 
the fact that it was carried out as a race with the Russians. The agency focused 
its single goal of moon landing and mobilized all of its resources. NASA’s cultural 
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variables thrived within this adhocracy structure. The frontier culture of NASA 
was a necessary part of innovation essential to space exploration. The main 
emphasis of the adhocracy structure which makes it different from other 
structures is the innovation. This fit kept the employees of the agency motivated 
which, in turn, supported trying and achieving new things. The challenges and 
difficulties of space exploration were overcome by the substantial information 
sharing and decentralized decision-making that the adhocracy valued. This 
structure also provided engineers and scientists with sufficient flexibility to use 
their expertise to solve complex problems of space flights they encountered while 
working on their projects. Engineers and scientists to improve their technical 
knowledge which is the source of their expertise had to place more value on 
hands-on experiences and in-house technical capability. The inclusion of multiple 
levels of employees in decision-making motivated the work force and helped 
program managers to make the best decisions. Thus, the relative fit led to 
realization of the agency’s objectives. In other words, the alignment between 
culture and NASA’s structure helped the agency to reach its goal of a lunar 
landing by the end of the decade. 
To summarize the chapter, NASA emerged from a conglomerate of pre-
existing organizations such as NACA, the ABMA, and groups from the military. 
And later it expanded its capabilities with new facilities to complete the moon 
landing task. The prior organizations were research-oriented containing well-
developed technical cultures. NASA did not impose a culture on any of these 
groups from other organizations to create a dominant culture. The building blocks 
of NASA’s culture were formed by the new interrelationships among these prior 
organizations. 
The key characteristics of NASA’s culture between 1958 and 1972 were 
extensive research and testing, hiring exceptional people, in-house capability, 
hands-on experience, frontier mentality, and seeing risk and failures as 
productive aspects of space exploration. NASA was able to hire the best  
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employees in the nation, thus creating a diverse yet focused workforce. With the 
help of significant financial support from the President and Congress, NASA 
accomplished the moon landing task in 1969. 
The Apollo task was so large and complex that many parts of it needed to 
be contracted out.  Contracting required development of project management 
skills. NASA brought in Air Force managers to key positions in program 
management. To maintain its high internal productivity, the agency preserved 
core activities such as in-house capability. The controlling and monitoring of 
contract work was clearly obtained though in-house capability. NASA’s technical 
and research culture, challenges of tasks, competitive salaries, flexible working 
arrangements with industry and universities, the country’s Cold War atmosphere, 
and the employee selection examination were crucial reasons for the agency’s 
exceptional work force.   
Presidential and Congressional support affected NASA culture positively 
in the first period. With the remarkable financial support, the field centers of the 
agency just focused on the challenging lunar landing goal. They did not have to 
compete among themselves to justify their existence at the expense of 
organizational performance. In addition, the agency being well-funded did not 
worry about the constraints resource. This kept NASA away from the politics and 
bureaucracy involved in getting funds. 
NASA could be able to have many instruments to better align its culture 
and people.  The instruments were the ability to offer challenging and motivating 
tasks, pay competitive salary, select best-fitting employees with a unique exam, 
and allow them easy movement in and out of the agency.  The technical and 
scientific culture ingredients inherited from prior organizations prospered, 
flourished, and became more distinct with the effective using of these 
instruments. In the end, the new space agency created a competitive workforce 
committed to the moon-landing task.  
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Finally, improvement and success in space exploration completely depend 
on innovation since the task would be the first of its type. The knowledge, 
experience and technology were limited and needed to be developed. The 
inherited technical and scientific culture could perform better in the structure in 
which its expertise is valued. The space agency had a decentralized adhocracy 
structure which its distinct characteristics were technical expertise, innovation, 
fast-decision making, autonomy and flexibility. On top of this, the agency 
changed its structure whenever the task required it to do so. For example, the 
agency centrally structured itself for the Apollo task. This restructuring by 
eliminating the number of levels of structure allowed the agency to respond 
quickly to the moon landing requirements. 
In the next chapter, the cultural analysis of NASA and its alignment with 
the other system components will be discussed during the second period of 
NASA (1996–2004). This period culminates with the Columbia accident. Also, 
whether the culture itself or its degree of alignment with other components 







V. NASA CULTURE: ALIGNMENT WITH TASK, PEOPLE, 
RESOURCES AND STRUCTURE, 1996 TO 2004 
This chapter is comprised of two parts:  First, we examine the culture of 
NASA during the period (1996—2004), then the alignment of NASA’s culture 
during this period with its task, people, resources, and structure.  In this chapter, 
the Roger Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
(CAIB) are primary sources for analyzing NASA’s culture.   
We intentionally defined four cultural factors that will help to analyze the 
NASA culture during this period. These cultural factors—“prove to fail/negative” 
culture, normalization of deviations and risk, insufficient communication (good 
news culture), and decreased flexibility (bureaucratic) culture—clearly 
contributed to the Challenger and Columbia accidents (The Rogers Commission 
Report, 1986 ; CAIB, 2003). In addition, it is apparent that these four cultural 
factors reflect a negative change in NASA’s culture. Although the scope of our 
project does not cover the  1972–1996 period, we will refer to that period, 
particularly factors impacting the Challenger accident, to better describe NASA 
culture between  1996–2004. We need to refer to the 1972–1996 period 
because many reports such as the Rogers Commission, the CAIB and academic 
studies suggest that the same or similar cultural issues were prevalent in the 
space agency during both accidents. At the end of this chapter, the 
(mis)alignment between the culture and system components are analyzed to 
explain how they contributed to the Columbia accident by creating structural and 
communication gaps resulting in failed performance.  
A. NASA CULTURE:  (1996–2004) 
After the “moon-landing period,” Congress began to decrease NASA’s 
annual budget because of the competing priorities of the Vietnam War and the 
nation’s deteriorating socio-economic conditions.  NASA embodied the nation’s 
scientific and technological expertise.  The Soviet space threat was perceived to 
diminish alongside diminished American political and societal support of manned 
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space exploration. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the 
tearing down of the Berlin Wall, made dominating space for military purposes a 
low priority.    
To justify its existence and to persuade the nation and Congress to 
continue to support the space program, NASA developed diversified goals in the 
mid-1970s.  These new goals included a space shuttle program, building an 
International Space Center (ISS), and the creation of the Hubble telescope.  The 
new space shuttle was designed as a reusable vehicle to prove that NASA could 
be cost-effective in future space exploration. The space agency also increased 
the number of flights per year and planned tight launch schedules to demonstrate 
productivity at minimal cost.  In addition, NASA sought to increase the public’s 
interest in space by sending a teacher on a space shuttle mission (the ill-fated 
Challenger flight) symbolizing how practically every American could benefit from 
space exploration. Also, to distribute the cost of space exploration to more 
countries, including Russia, NASA collaborated with other nations by starting 
development of the International Space Station. 
The Rogers Commission and CAIB both placed significant blame for the 
Challenger and Columbia accidents on the culture that existed at NASA.  This 
culture was influenced by a silent safety program, budgetary constraints, flight 
schedule pressures, and normalization of deviance and risk. The CAIB report 
suggested, “By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were 
in effect at the time of the Challenger accident—such as inadequate concern 
over deviations from expected performance, a silent safety program, and 
schedule pressure—had returned to NASA” (CAIB, 2003, p. 101). 
NASA began to outsource larger portions of projects, than it did during the 
Apollo project.  Instead of concentrating on improving the safety and managerial 
factors that could negatively affect the space program’s performance as 
recommended by various commissions, NASA tried to do more with less, 
developing a  culture of doing things “faster, better, cheaper.”  
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 Now that we have outlined the environment in which NASA operated in 
during the second period, we focus our attention on the four cultural factors we 
conclude contributed to the Columbia disaster.  We provide specific examples to 
support our claim that these factors negatively impacted the organization’s 
performance.  Additionally, we assess the degree of alignment between culture 
and the system components during this period. 
1. “Proving a Negative” Culture 
Although NASA believed that it had a safety program that was active, risk-
averse, and empowered to stop any operations if an employee felt there was a 
problem that compromised flight safety, unfortunately, the CAIB (2003) found no 
evidence of the safety office operating independently. This fact undermined the 
belief that NASA had a dedicated safety culture for safe operations in space. 
NASA’s safety culture “has become reactive, complacent, and dominated by 
unjustified optimism. Overtime, slowly and unintentionally, independent checks 
and balances intended to increase safety have been eroded in favor of detailed 
processes that produce massive amounts of data and unwarranted consensus, 
but little effective communication” (CAIB, 2003, p. 180).   
This lack of independence within the safety office was a recurring theme 
at NASA.  At least four more reports outside of the Rogers Commission and 
CAIB aimed at analyzing NASA mentioned the safety center issue.  The CAIB 
report insisted: “The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team and NASA 
Integrated Action Team findings mirror those presented by the Rogers 
Commission. The same communication problems persisted in the Space Shuttle 
Program at the time of the Columbia accident (CAIB, 2003 p. 179).”  A US 
Senator from South Carolina, Ernest “Fritz” Hollings, stated at a Senate 
Commerce Committee hearing on the results of the CAIB’s report on the 
Columbia accident, “There’s no education in the second kick of a mule. I’m 
hearing the same things I listened to seventeen years ago” (Berger, 2003). 
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The second aspect of proving a negative culture that existed in NASA was 
the need for scientists and engineers to prove a project launch was unsafe.  The 
previous culture relied on engineers and scientists to prove that a project launch 
was safe. This cultural change occurred during both the Challenger and 
Columbia eras.  The Rogers Commission and the CAIB found this to be true with 
the engineering decisions made to launch both shuttles (CAIB, 2003, p. 177).  In 
his testimony to the Rogers Commission in January of 1987, Roger Boisjoly 
described a teleconference between Thiokol and NASA as “a meeting where the 
determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position is 
in a preflight conversation” (Presidential Commission, 1986, p. 93). Mr. Boisjoly 
was Thiokol’s O-ring expert and advised NASA on technical issues regarding the 
O-ring.  Another example of how the “prove it is unsafe culture” exemplified the 
culture of NASA is the testimony from the former vice-president of engineering at 
Thiokol, Robert Lund, who also testified to the Rogers Commission that he had 
no choice but to change his original recommendation to “not launch” because he 
now had to prove it was unsafe to launch: “We had to prove to them that we 
weren’t ready, and so we got ourselves in the thought process that we were 
trying to find some way to prove to them it wouldn’t work, and we were unable to 
do that. We couldn’t prove absolutely that the motor wouldn’t work” (Presidential 
Commission, 1986, p. 811).  Therefore, NASA’s culture of proving the negative—
that a launch was unsafe—which developed prior to the Challenger disaster also 
characterized NASA culture prior to the Columbia mishap.  
A third indication of how NASA culture had changed during the second 
period was how employees classified shuttle mishaps and maintenance issues.  
In hind sight, the O-ring incident which the Roger’s Commission labeled as the 
root physical cause of the Challenger explosion could have been reclassified as 
an ongoing safety problem requiring a higher level of alert during the flight 
readiness review process.   
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The CAIB stated that the breach in the thermal protection system from 
insulated foam that separated and struck the reinforced carbon panel is 
considered to be the physical cause of the loss of the Columbia. This Shuttle 
mission (STS-107) was not the first flight to lose foam from the main fuel tank. 
Foam loss was again flagged as a problem after STS 112, which was launched 
three months prior to the disaster and flown by Space Shuttle Atlantis. Two 
missions prior to the Columbia’s final launch foam loss occurred, but this time an 
Integrated Hazard Report (IHR) was generated due to the relative size and 
damage caused during this flight.  During the Flight Readiness Review for STS-
113, a decision was made to launch without first resolving the foam IHR.  
Justification for the decision was based on past performance of prior shuttles.  
Foam loss had never before been classified as a flight safety issue, and no 
orbiter had ever been damaged enough to create belief that flight safety was 
compromised. Given this historical evidence, it was concluded that the shuttle 
was “safe to fly with no new concerns and no new risk” (CAIB, 2003, p. 125).  
The decision to go ahead and launch is consistent with the “silent safety” culture 
during this time period.   
 Given the frequency of lost foam striking the orbiter, it would seem that 
NASA would have been proactive to prevent further foam strikes from occurring.  
Unfortunately, NASA decided to classify the foam strikes as only a maintenance 
issue, which downgraded the importance of the problem to a routine difficulty.  
The CAIB report suggests, “with each successful landing, it appears that NASA 
engineers and managers increasingly regarded the foam-shedding as inevitable, 
and as either unlikely to jeopardize safety or simply an acceptable risk. The 
distinction between foam loss and debris events also appears to have become 
blurred. NASA and contractor personnel came to view foam strikes not as a 
safety of flight issue, but rather a simple maintenance, or “turnaround” issue” 
(CAIB, p. 122).  The space shuttle was designed with the assumption that the 
booster tanks would not experience any shedding of ice or debris such as foam.  
Interestingly, a Naval Postgraduate School professional report states, “one of the 
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original requirements for the Space Shuttle System was that there should be no 
shedding of ice or other debris during pre-launch and flight. As a result of this 
requirement, the orbiter was allowed to be designed with a fragile thermal 
protection system, with minimal requirements to withstand any debris strikes” 
(Gregory, Marcellino, and Moyer, 2006).   
In 1983, the first bipod foam loss was discovered on the Challenger.  The 
problem was classified as an anomaly, and it was required to be resolved before 
the shuttle could be launched again. Due to repairs to the Orbiter’s thermal 
protection system, the anomaly was closed.  Unfortunately, the shedding of foam 
insulation during launch was never addressed. These examples clearly show that 
NASA developed a culture of downgrading the importance of mishaps and 
maintenance problems to stay on schedule and not delay shuttle operations.  
2. Normalization of Deviation and Risk Acceptance 
The safety culture of NASA during the second period was a direct 
reflection of the normalization of deviation phenomena.  The theory of 
normalizing is one that occurs from correcting a problem that requires minor 
adjustments be made to ensure the project or product continues to run smoothly.  
The root cause of the problem never really gets addressed; therefore, the 
problem always exists until the primary cause is found and fixed.  Hence, the 
numerous O-ring and foam loss problems that plagued shuttle operations 
persisted because these problems or deviations were “normalized,” resulting in 
the prime causes of these problems not being addressed.  
The acceptance and normalization of risk occurred in NASA at the highest 
levels of management.  The CAIB reports that during the Flight Readiness 
Reviews for STS-41C, the SRB project manager at Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Lawrence Mulloy, deemed that some O-ring erosion was acceptable because of 
the redundancy of the SRB O-ring seals (Presidential Commission, 1986, p. 
132). There were many examples of O-ring erosion during this time period: in 
1984 three of four flights, in 1985 eight of nine flights, and the flight mission 
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preceding the Challenger all experienced O-ring erosion.  Due to a culture that 
normalized risk, it is not surprising that at Marshall and Thiokol, senior 
management classified the O-ring erosion as allowable and acceptable (Choo, p. 
159).  This normalization and acceptance of risk significantly altered NASA safety 
culture as early as 1982. 
The Columbia disaster provides a more recent example of how 
normalization of risk undermined NASA’s safety culture. Prior to Columbia’s 
disintegration over the southwestern United States, the same faulty pattern of 
classifying anomalous foam strikes as “maintenance” vice “technical” occurred.   
The CAIB’s investigation revealed that NASA managers had come to accept the 
fuel tank foam loss and subsequent impact on the orbiter as “acceptable.”  In 
retrospect, NASA management used historical successes as validation of the 
likelihood of future mission accomplishment, despite deviations from the system’s 
intended design and functionality (CAIB, 2003, p. 100). Another example of this 
mode of organizational thinking occurred after the flight of STS-112, when two 
more flights were scheduled before confirmation was received from the 
investigation team investigating the foam strike during that mission. This 
scheduling can be seen as an unwise effort to adhere to a “success-oriented” 
program or schedule. The CAIB report (2003) states: “It seems that Shuttle 
managers had become conditioned over time to not regard foam loss or debris 
as a safety-of-flight concern.”  These three specific examples outlined in this 
section provide strong support that the safety culture of NASA was negatively 
affected by the overwhelming organizational mindset among senior managers to 
normalize risk, even though NASA scientists, engineers and contractors 
remained risk averse. 
3. Agreement with Managers Communication Culture 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board made some rather interesting 
discoveries concerning the communication problems that existed during the 
second period between management and the engineering communities: 
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“Managers’ tendency to accept opinions that agree with their own dams the flow 
of effective communications” (CAIB, 2003, p. 169). Managers tended to reject 
opposing opinions and accept only those similar to their own.  Engineers no 
longer felt they could freely express their opinions without being ridiculed. The 
CAIB report stated that: “managers did not seem to understand that as leaders 
they had a corresponding and perhaps greater obligation to create viable routes 
for the engineering community to express their views and receive information. 
This barrier to communications not only blocked the flow of information to 
mangers, it also prevented the down stream flow of information from managers to 
engineers, leaving Debris Assessment Team members no basis for 
understanding the reasoning behind Mission Management Team decisions” 
(CAIB, 2003, p.169). At the time of the Columbia accident, the communication 
structure of NASA was flawed. The CAIB observed that “program leaders spent 
at least as much time making sure hierarchical rules and processes were 
followed as they did trying to establish why anyone would want a picture of the 
Orbiter” (CAIB, 2003, p. 181).  This example shows the lack of an effective 
communication structure that did not adequately provide the Missions 
Management Team (MMT) with valuable information, thereby contributing to 
flawed decision making.  
The CAIB report suggests that the use of PowerPoint briefing slides 
instead of technical papers led to a problematic technical communication at 
NASA (CAIB, 2003).  The overuse of PowerPoint briefings, in place of detailed 
analysis, made it difficult for meeting attendees to identify what the launch risks 
were for Columbia (Guthrie and Shayo, 2005).  PowerPoint is a useful tool 
organizations use to “brief” information to a specified group of individuals.  
Hence, the word “brief” means exactly that; to provide the audience with the 
information needed in a short, concise, and brief manner.  Therefore, the use of 
PowerPoint slides may not have been the most effective communication tool to 
use in communicating extremely technical information.  Nor was it a good tool for 
engineers and scientists to use to express dissenting viewpoints to management 
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whom created a “good news” culture.  Additionally, information passed through 
NASA in other forms such as the extensive use of viewgraphs. In Visual 
Explanations (1997), Tufte analyzed the Challenger disaster, showing 13 view 
graphs prepared for management and faxed to NASA.  The critique stated the 
charts were unconvincing and non-explicit in stating the impact of temperature on 
O-rings (Guthrie and Shayo, 2005).  As a result, the use of viewgraphs to simplify 
information eliminates many details that may be critical to decision making, and 
can reduce the importance of critical problems.  As stated earlier, management 
was not accustomed to seek out minority opinions in order to better understand 
the opportunities available and other viewpoints, which could impact decision 
making.  Therefore, the barriers of communication between managers and 
engineers, and the incorrect use of communication tools led NASA to have an 
ineffective communication culture during the Columbia era.  
4. Decreasing Flexibility 
NASA culture also became less flexible for two reasons: the gradual loss 
of its technical culture and a more bureaucratic structure. NASA’s technical 
culture decreased in power and influence as a result of reduced in-house 
capabilities and hands-on experience among the workforce, which discouraged 
engineers and scientists.  According to McCurdy, “NASA employees found 
themselves increasingly distanced from the actual work of space flight, while 
organizational resistance to bureaucracy diminished.  The original culture lost its 
power to elicit behavior compatible with the dominant cultural norms” (McCurdy, 
1993, p. 133).  Previously, hands-on experience and in-house capabilities were 
valued at NASA during the first period. However, increasing amounts of NASA 
work was contracted out causing hands-on experience and in-house capability to 
erode.  As a result, NASA scientists and engineers were transformed into 
contract administrators which compromised the agency’s technical capability. 
McCurdy states “no single factor affected NASA’s technical culture more than the 
increased use of contractors” (McCurdy, 1993, p. 134).   
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The larger NASA grew, the more difficult it became for headquarters to 
operate as one entity under a primarily adhocracy structure.  As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, NASA started relying more heavily on a bureaucratic structure to 
manage its diversified portfolio of projects.  As a result, “The agency may lose 
that flexibility it enjoyed during its formative years.  It may become more 
bureaucratic, and its managers may grow more conservative or averse to risk” 
(McCurdy, 1993, p. 99).  NASA continued to show signs of a transformed 
organizational structure with characteristics such as limited horizontal 
decentralization, often typical of large, mature organizations.  The new change 
conflicted with how the organization had always been structured and it was 
difficult for the workforce to endure.  The workforce also began aging and the 
“new blood” which previously had consistently entered the organization annually 
slowed.  McCurdy exclaims, “The number of young people entering the workforce 
declined.  Engineers and scientists, the core professional group within NASA, 
advanced in years.  As an example, the average age of scientists and engineers 
increase by four percent between 1966—1990; and the percentage of scientists 
and engineers 25—34 years of age declined by six percent during the same time 
frame” (McCurdy table, 1993, p. 105).  This change in the make-up of the 
workforce contributed to the decline in flexibility of the organization.  McCurdy 
further submits: 
Social scientists have speculated about the cumulative effect of 
changes such as these on the machinery of public administration.  
Four effects have special importance:  the loss of flexibility that 
comes with age, the tendency of agencies to grow more 
bureaucratic with time, the likelihood that their executives will 
become risk-averse as they and their agencies age, and the 
inclination of agencies struggling to survive to alter their methods of 
operation (p. 106). 
Therefore, the breakdown in safety culture, normalization of deviance, an 
“agreement with management” communication norm, and declining flexibility 
defined an organizational culture during the Columbia period significantly  
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different from NASA’s culture during the Apollo project period.  The next segment 
examines the extent to which task, people, resources, and structure were aligned 
with this changed culture during the second period.   
B. NASA CULTURE:  ALIGNMENT WITH TASK, PEOPLE, RESOURCES, 
AND STRUCTURE (1996—2004) 
1. Task 
In the first period (1958—1972), we concluded that NASA’s overarching 
task, although visionary induced, was specific and complex, with a definitive end-
state.  When President Kennedy vowed to land a man on the moon and bring 
him back safely, he both challenged and empowered NASA to complete an 
extremely challenging mission. 
In the Columbia period, NASA was dealing with two dependent tasks:  
the ISS and the Space Shuttle Program. Although the agency declared the space 
shuttle in the early 1980’s as “operational” versus “developmental/experimental,” 
various problems such as foam strikes had been occurring in the shuttle flights. 
In other words, the entire history of the shuttle program may thus be viewed as 
the “incubation period” where failures persist or accumulate for the Columbia 
disaster. Additionally, design alterations and unpredictable flight conditions led to 
anomalies on many flight shuttle missions. In sum, the space shuttle was not 
meeting the demands of operational capability which increased the risks of the 
Shuttle flights. The CAIB emphasized the risk of space flight as: “operation of the 
space shuttle, and all human space flight, is a developmental activity with high 
inherent risks” (CAIB, 2003, p. 9). 
The CAIB report stated that, with the International Space Center assembly 
more than half-complete, the station and the shuttle programs had become 
irreversibly linked. Such dependency between the two programs served to 
reduce the value of STS-107’s Flight Readiness Review because a delay in STS-
107’s launch would cause serious delays in the completion of the Space station. 
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The CAIB explained that: “Any problems with or perturbations to the planned 
schedule of one program reverberated through both programs” (2003, p. 117).  
The fiscal year 2002 budget announced that the US part of the ISS would 
be considered complete with the installation on the ISS of “Node 2,” which would 
allow Europe and Japan to connect their laboratory modules to the station. Node 
2 was to be launched in 2004 (CAIB, 2003). Five shuttle launches were planned 
until the launch of Node 2. Any technical problem that delays one launch would 
directly affect the Node 2 launch (CAIB, 2003). In 2002, STS-112, the fourth flight 
before Columbia, flew and lost foam. The review board assigned an action to the 
loss but the due date for the action was delayed due to the next flight, STS-113. 
The CAIB stated that: “The pressing need to launch STS-113, to retrieve the 
International Space Center Expedition 5 crew… and to continue to countdown to 
Node 2 were surely in the back of managers’ minds during these reviews” (2003, 
p. 138). The STS-107, Columbia, Mission Management Team chair, Linda Ham, 
joined the discussion of the foam of STST-112, and also joined the Flight 
Readiness Review for STS-113. She was also launch integration manager of the 
STS-114 mission. After the foam loss of Columbia shuttle, most of her inquiries 
about the strike were not about what action to take for Columbia but how to 
understand the implications for STS-114. The space shuttle program concerns 
about the Columbia foam strike were not about the threat it might pose to STS-
107 but the threat it might pose to the schedule (CAIB, 2003, p. 139).  
Consequently, the interdependency of the Space Station program with the 
Shuttle program increased overall complexity, causing serious gaps between 
management, engineer and safety mindsets. The shuttle program promised to 
frequent access to space with a tight flight schedule. However, linkages of tasks 
(the Shuttle and the ISS) created pressures and trade-offs concerning flight 
schedules. Agreement with Shuttle program managers dominated discussions, 
creating a norm of top-down, yet fractured communications. The safety culture 
eroded over time and a “prove it is unsafe” culture fit with the new direction of 
staying on schedule—apparently at all costs. Flight problems were increasingly 
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treated as normal based on previous flights with foam problems. The 
bureaucratic culture of NASA was doing what machine bureaucracies often do— 
maintain stability and predictability, which does not include “rocking the boat.”   
2. People 
During this second period, NASA lost its “research-oriented” technical 
culture which encouraged the agency to hire highly skilled personnel in the first 
period. Additionally, a substantial occupational cultural conflict emerged between 
managers and engineers, which included substantial and enduring differences in 
values.  As clarified in Chapter II, the integration and attainment of a strong, 
aligned organizational culture is paramount for successful overall performance. 
On top of that, there was a considerable work force reduction in the second 
period, obviously introducing the added pressure of possible job loss. 
Beginning in the 1970s, NASA became a much more bureaucratic 
organization that had moved away from the “research-oriented” culture of Apollo, 
and organizational power shifted from the core of researchers and engineers to 
the upper levels of management. After the Challenger disaster, the change 
appeared even more dramatic, and the CAIB reported this: “The Space Shuttle 
program had been built on compromises hammered out by the White House and 
NASA headquarters. As a result, NASA was transformed from a research and 
development agency to a more of a business, with schedules, production 
pressures, deadlines, and cost efficiency goals elevated to the level of technical 
innovation and safety goals” (CAIB, 2003, p. 199). The agency’s Apollo era 
research and development cultural respect for technical expertise among its 
working engineers was overridden in the space shuttle era by “bureaucratic 
accountability.” The procedures, the chain of command and hierarchy were the 
new norms that engineers and scientists had to obey during their projects. In 
sum, NASA’s culture traded its “research-oriented” attractiveness for command, 
control and accountability to a pluralism of stakeholders. 
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The Columbia period exemplifies the almost insoluble conflict between 
engineers and managers. The managerial mindset was to maintain tight flight 
schedules, decrease costs per flight, focus on the funding, and assure the 
smooth continuation of the program. The engineering mindset was to always lean 
in the direction of safety through testing and retesting. The CAIB succinctly 
described this issue in terms of work being scheduled on holidays, a third shift of 
workers being hired and trained, future crew rotations drifting beyond 180 days, 
and some tests previously deemed ‘requirements’ being skipped or deferred.  
Program managers estimated that Node 2 launch would be one to two 
months late. “They were slowly accepting additional risk in trying to meet a 
schedule that probably could not be met” (2003, p. 138).  Clearly, managers 
overruling engineers and scientists in the divided tasking of the space agency 
confused and frustrated the previously dominant scientific culture. Another 
example showing occupational cultural conflict occurred after the moon-landing. 
Morton Thiokol’s general manager, Jerald Mason, at the meeting where the 
launch of Challenger was unanimously approved by four managers who ignored 
the engineers sitting with them around the table said: “take off your engineering 
hat and put on your management hat” (Milliken & Starbuck, 1988). NASA 
dominant mindsets were in conflict, and the occupational cultures were not 
integrated resulting in disastrous decisions. The conflicts between a safety-first, 
and a schedule-first mindset contributed to the Columbia disaster.  
Finally, there was a sizable reduction in the NASA workforce throughout 
1990s.  Between 1993 and 2003, 6,000 jobs were cut causing a 25 percent 
workforce reduction (CAIB, 2003, p. 110), which also adversely affected 
employees and the Shuttle program. For the Shuttle program alone, headcount 
was reduced from 120 in 1993 to 12 in 2003 (CAIB, 2003, p. 110). When paired 
with the “faster, better, cheaper” motto of the 1990s, personnel cuts dramatically 
decreased numbers of safety personnel, refocusing the surviving personnel 
around business efficiency principles (CAIB, 2003, p. 199).  
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To summarize, the emerging and dominant hierarchical bureaucratic 
culture did not fit the original scientific and safety orientation of the agency, 
including loss of appeal for attracting new engineers and scientists. Also, 
workforce reductions exacerbated the occupational cultural divide by ensuring 
surviving technical personnel understood their diminished roles.  
3. Resources 
The resource component in the second period was slightly changed in the 
Columbia period.  Time for example, became more critical due to the importance 
of maintaining tight flight schedules.  This section focuses primarily on capital 
resources, including added pressures resulting from requirements to operate in 
an environment of constrained resources.  “Pressures” translated into 
preoccupation with tight budgets, tight flight schedule operations, and a yielding 
to business and political priorities.  NASA management was convinced it needed 
to generate additional revenues by undertaking new, private sector projects 
(CAIB, 2003, p. 111). These ill-conceived projects ultimately failed and used up 
resources, while the international space center fell behind schedule and went 
over budget (CAIB, 2003, pp. 107-110). The Shuttle program was weakened by a 
lack of investment in safety upgrades and infrastructure (CAIB, 2003, pp. 111, 
114-115).  Again, new priorities mixed with declining resources negatively 
affected the culture.   
By 2001, a succession of failed investments and inadequate cost-control 
efforts had tarnished NASA’s credibility, and Congress withdrew their long-term 
commitment to financing the ISS program. Instead, Congress put the agency on 
probation, requesting that NASA refocus its resources on the ISS program and 
simultaneously reduce program costs (CAIB, 2003, p. 117).  They also requested 
that completion of a critical part of the program (Node 2) be reached within the 




launching Node 2 within the allocated budget, the ISS program would be 
eliminated, and NASA’s future ability to get funded would be substantially 
impaired (CAIB, 2003, pp. 116-117). 
After a decade of lay-offs, misdirected research efforts, frequent starts and 
stops on projects, and underinvestment in infrastructure and safety issues, the 
organization lost its temporal resilience. 
NASA continued to be dependent on contracting-out with industry leaders 
in order to fulfill its missions under limited resources.  Contracts were for 
numerous parts of the space and shuttle programs such as engines, 
communication systems, and satellites.  If vital parts were not provided, the 
space and shuttle programs would not survive. However, contractors’ work 
appeared to fall under the required and expected operational and safety 
intentions. For example, from the beginning, Morton Thiokol provided a faulty O-
ring design. 
NASA’s core competencies were in design plans and operations of the 
space and shuttle programs; therefore, it appeared beneficial to contract out 
production work.   
NASA began experiencing “constrained resources” during the early 1970s, 
no doubt an unfamiliar state from the 1960’s when the programs were fully 
funded and the nation supported the mission.  Figure 8 displays NASA’s budget 
from 1962–2002.   During the 40 years span, NASA reached its budget peak in 
1966 and reached its bottom in 1976.   NASA continued to be funded at a rate 
below historical averages. Between 1993 and 2002, the governments 
discretionary spending grew in purchasing power by more than 25 percent, 
defense spending by 15 percent, and non-defense spending by 40 percent. 
NASA’s budget, in comparison, showed little change, going from $14.31 billion in 
Fiscal Year 1993 to a low of $13.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2000, and increasing to 
$14.87 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. This represented a loss of 13 percent in 
purchasing power over the decade.  
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Faced with this budget situation, NASA had the choice of either 
eliminating major programs or achieving greater efficiencies while maintaining its 
existing agenda. Agency leaders chose to attempt the latter. They continued to 
develop the Space Station and continued Shuttle-based missions. In 1994, they 
took on the responsibility for developing an advanced technology launch vehicle 
in partnership with the private sector, while attempting to be more efficient, hence 
the 1990s branding of “faster, better, cheaper.” 
A relatively flat NASA budget appeared to particularly affect the human 
space flight enterprise. During the decade before the Columbia accident, NASA 
rebalanced the share of its budget allocated to human space flight from 48 
percent of agency funding in Fiscal Year 1991 to 38 percent in Fiscal Year 1999, 
with the remainder going mainly to other science and technology efforts. On 
NASA’s fixed budget, that meant the space shuttle and the international space 
station were competing for decreasing resources. 
NASA has endured an environment of constrained resources since the 
1970s. These pressures encouraged management to develop a culture of cost-
savings, cost-efficiency, and flight schedule order. 
  
 
Figure 8.   NASA’s Budget (1958—2001) (From: National Association of 
Science Writers, www.nasw.org, accessed December 2007) 
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To summarize, constrained (flat) resources, time and political pressures 
and dependence on contracting were serious precursors contributing to 
managements’ behaviors crowding-out safety concerns, including the 
engineering personnel voicing those concerns.  NASA sought and emphasized 
cost saving initiatives attempting to maximize allocated funds.  In sum, misfits of 
key factors continued to abound during the Columbia period. 
4. Structure 
Several authors (McCurdy, 1993; Minztberg, 1979) suggest that 
organizational structure changes as the organization ages and grows. In other 
words, it is difficult to maintain the same organizational structure for extended 
time periods. 
When the Columbia accident happened, 45 years had passed since the 
establishment of NASA. During this time period, the agency’s space shuttle 
program promising frequent access to space and construction of the ISS in an 
environment of constrained resources contributed to a structural shift from 
adhocracy to machine bureaucracy. So structure, goals and cultural mindsets 
became malaligned.  
The bureaucratic NASA structure contributed to the Columbia accident 
(CAIB, 2003). During the Columbia period, NASA partially made the structural 
changes that the Rogers Commission recommended, e.g., centralizing 
operations and safety controls. Although the agency initiated the recommended 
Headquarters Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (Safety and 
Mission Assurance Office), it did not provide direct authority over all safety 
operations as recommended; rather, each center had its own safety group 
reporting to the center director (CAIB, 2003, p. 101). 
According to the CAIB: “NASA did not adequately prepare for the 
consequences of adding organizational structure and process complexity in the 
transition to the Space Flight Operations Contract. The agency’s lack of a 
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centralized clearinghouse for integration and safety further hindered safe 
operations” (2003, p. 187). The Safety Office was not structurally linked to shuttle 
program management during the Columbia accident. The CAIB further explained 
that: “Given that the entire Safety and Mission organization depends on the 
shuttle program for resources and simultaneously lacks the independent ability to 
conduct detailed analysis, cost and schedule pressures can easily and 
unintentionally influence safety deliberations. Structure and process places 
Shuttle safety programs in the unenviable position of having to choose between 
rubber-stamping engineering analysis, technical efforts, and Shuttle program 
decisions, or trying to carry the day during a committee meeting in which the 
other side almost always has more information and analytic capability (p. 187), 
Figure 1 shows the Safety Office within NASA at the time of Columbia accident.  
 
Figure 9.   Safety Office within NASA Organization at Time of the Columbia 
Accident (From: Columbia Accident Investigation Board, (p. 185)) 
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As seen in Figure 9, management did not empower the Safety Office, 
including being reliant on the funding from the shuttle program they supported, 
instead of being independent. If the budget of the program was reduced, the 
safety group was likely to take as much of a cut as any other part of the program. 
Also, if the number of flights were reduced, the funds for flights would also be 
reduced or the program would be cancelled.  This was a significant risk that not 
only affected the space shuttle program, but the International Space Station 
would also suffer since the shuttle program had been used to transport parts of 
the ISS. 
The structural (financial) dependency of the safety office, competing 
priorities, and conflicting interests’ of safety personnel (survival) eroded overall 
safety pushing the once dominant value to the sidelines. No single person was 
responsible for Shuttle mission safety, and the office did not provide an 
integrated organizational process for ensuring safety remained paramount.  
The CAIB (2003) called for the agency to make structural changes to 
improve the problematic safety structure by creating a centralized safety 
oversight. A new shuttle Safety Panel would report to the shuttle program 
manager. Also, an independent Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance would be established, headed by an associate NASA administrator, 
with independent funding and direct authority over all safety bodies throughout 
the agency. It would report to the NASA administrator, rather than program 
manager, thus keeping safety structurally separate from the part of NASA 
responsible for budget and operations efficiency. 
As a conclusion, the structural dependency of the Safety Office created 
financial dependency degrading the ability to intervene based on safety 
concerns. NASA structure therefore reinforced its “silent safety” culture, its 
normalization of deviances and risk, and its protocol of bowing to management 
when addressing safety concerns, i.e., a communications gap or misfit between 
managerial and engineering cultures. Possibly, although difficult to provide clear  
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evidence, structural dependency might also lead to “cultural dependence” in 
terms of the Safety Office adopting the same mindset of program managers over 
time, thereby forfeiting their primary function.    
NASA culture changed substantially into a “prove it is unsafe” mentality, 
normalization of deviance and risk, decreased flexibility, and ineffective 
communication leading to the misalignment of system components ultimately 
degrading performance.  NASA developed diversified goals not supported or 
aligned with its earlier culture.  Space flights in the first and second periods 
required overarching and comprehensive safety linkages, but during the second 
period values shifted to a “prove it is unsafe” launch mindset.  Normalization or 
rationalization of operational deviations widened the gap. NASA continued to fly 
the shuttle even with the known problems of O-ring blow-by and foam breakage 
from the launch vehicle.  
Due to increasingly tight and decreasing financial resources, NASA 
adopted an extremely tight flight schedule to demonstrate its efficiency and cost 
reductions per flight to policy makers.  Unfortunately, compressed schedules 
exacerbated safety problems. With a limited budget, the agency contracted out 
the critical parts of the shuttle project including design and testing. Contractors 
were told to perform thorough testing of shuttle components at their 
manufacturing plants and to deliver components to the launch site ready to fly 
(McCurdy, 1993).  As a result, the agency lost portions of its internal capability. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This research examined the interaction of external and internal 
organizational variables affecting cultural changes occurring in NASA during two 
key time-periods, 1958–1972 and 1996–2004.  In the first timeframe, 1958–
1972, cultural characteristics are described which may have positively 
contributed to the successful landing and safe return of a man on the moon. 
During the second timeframe, 1996–2004, culturally relevant factors are 
described and analyzed that could have contributed to the Columbia shuttle 
disaster.  
This work used a modified version of McCaskey’s open systems model to 
determine the degree of alignment between NASA culture and important system 
components—task, people, resources, and structure—during these two periods. 
Finally, this research determined if there was a relationship between NASA’s 
organizational performance and the degree of alignment between NASA’s culture 
and its system components.  
The conclusion of the project indicates that while the key variables of 
NASA’s culture were well aligned with the system components—task, people, 
resources, and structure—and supported the task performance in the first period 
(1958–1972), a lack of congruence between the system components of the 
space agency and its culture caused a performance gap that led to the Columbia 
disaster in the second period (1996–2004).  
Organizational culture can be described as patterns of shared beliefs, 
values and assumptions over time, which guide members of the organization as 
to the correct way to perceive, think about, and solve organizational problems. 
These patterns develop over time so that beliefs and values become shared and 
the behaviors that result from them are considered normal and thus accepted.  
Culture is transmitted and taught to new members through a process of 
socialization, which is a valuable managerial tool for  creating a sense of identity, 
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promoting organizational commitment, enhancing social system stability, and 
serving as a sense-making device that can guide and shape behavior (O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 1997; Simircich, 1983). Additionally, culture affects the decision-
making process by framing the interpretations of the members of the 
organizations. The employees attach importance to their priorities according to 
their assumptions and values. 
Culture can be the most abstract aspect of an organization. The most 
intriguing aspect of culture is that it points to phenomena that are below the 
organizational surface, that are powerful in their impact but invisible and to a 
considerable degree unconscious. Culture is to a group or organization what 
personality or character is to an individual. Yet, just as the personality and 
character guide and constraint an individual behavior, so does culture guide and 
constrain the behavior of a group through the shared norms, values and 
assumptions held by the group. In this sense, culture is a valuable tool of social 
control in organizations.  
Organizational culture is one of the key variables affecting organizational 
performance. Ouchi and Wilkins (1983) have clearly pointed out that 
“organizational performance cannot be adequately nor accurately understood 
without a comprehension of the culture of the organization” (p. 469). In addition, 
many other researchers (Barney, 1991; Gordon, 1985; Hesket & Kotter, 1992; 
Peters & Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1996) have supported the argument that 
cultural “strength” or certain kinds of cultures correlate with company 
performance. However, strong cultures that do not fit a company’s environment 
can lead intelligent people to behave destructively, undermining an organization’s 
ability to survive and prosper (Hesket &, Kotter, 1992). In other words, whether or 
not a culture is “good” or “bad,” “functionality effective” or not, depends not on the 
culture alone, but on the alignment of culture with important organizational 
components (O’Reilly & Tushman, 1997; Schein, 2004). 
This project’s analysis demonstrated the importance of alignment between 
NASA’s culture and its key organizational components. Furthermore, the degree 
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of alignment correlated with NASA’s performance. Specifically, the space 
agency’s technical and research culture was closely aligned with key 
organizational components—task, people, resources and structure. This 
alignment enabled NASA to complete successfully one of the most challenging 
missions given to an agency: landing a man on the moon before the end of the 
1960s. Figure 10 outlines NASA culture between 1958–1972 and its alignment 
with key system components using as a framework a modified version of 
McCaskey’s organizational systems model. 
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Figure 10.   The fit of NASA culture and organizational components (1958—1972) 
(After: McCaskey (1974); Nadler & Tushman, (1997)) 
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As easily seen from Figure 10, NASA had a clearly defined moon-landing 
task which kept the people of the agency alert and motivated. If the agency put a 
man on the moon before 1970, the technological and scientific superiority of the 
US would be established against Russia. NASA’s knowledge about manned 
space exploration was limited at the beginning. As a result, the agency 
developed two intermediate projects: Mercury, Gemini. NASA incrementally 
increased the space exploration knowledge with these two projects. In other 
words, it developed further operational capability in space and became 
experienced about the problems of living and working in space. These two 
projects were necessary to develop the scientific and engineering knowledge 
required to complete Project Apollo successfully.  
The Mercury, Gemini and particularly the Apollo project required NASA to 
contract out much of its because the agency did not have the in-house capability 
to do all the work in-house. However, NASA effectively controlled and monitored 
the contractors by doing the most important parts of the projects such as design 
in-house.  
NASA’s culture facilitated the agency’s task performance. In-house 
technical capability, research and testing, hands-on experience, seeing risk and 
failures as part of the space exploration, frontier mentality and hiring exceptional 
people were the distinct cultural factors during the first period of the space 
agency (1958—1972). In short, it had a technical and research culture. With its 
technical and scientific in-house expertise, NASA completed the critical parts of 
the projects with its own people and successfully managed the contractors, 
insuring that design, cost and schedule met the moon-landing program 
requirements. This was very important since the moon-landing task had a time 
constraint. In-house capability also enabled the agency’s employees to acquire 
hands-on experience. Regardless of the cost incurred by testing, learning, 




involved in space flights were recognized, but no flights were allowed before 
eliminating all recognizable problems. Extensive research and testing were done 
to accumulate knowledge that ensured safety. 
In addition, people were allowed to make mistakes and learn from those 
mistakes. The engineers and scientists were given flexibility and autonomy in 
their projects to try out new ideas, to innovate and to sharpen their skills. The 
decisions were made based on the technical merits and people of the agency 
voiced their concern in the decision-making process. The culture energized its 
people to accomplish the task. 
One of the reasons behind the successful moon landing was the 
exceptional work force of NASA which was well-aligned with the task and the 
substantial financial support. The agency’s internal organizational environment 
was very attractive because of NASA’s technical and research culture, 
challenging tasks, competitive salaries, and flexible working arrangements with 
industry and universities for skilled engineers and scientists. Additionally, the 
outside environment of the agency was supportive due to the country’s Cold War 
atmosphere. Highly skilled people who wanted to do their duty for their country 
viewed NASA as an ideal place to work. The agency was able to select people 
with the skills required to complete its demanding work and to fit its culture 
through a rigorous employee selection examination.. Finally, NASA was able to 
attract and retain a young, competent, ambitious, committed and motivated 
workforce who met rigorous task demands. The technical and scientific culture of 
the organization prospered, flourished, and became more distinct due to its ability 
to hire people with the unique blend of skills and motivation that NASA required 
to meet the challenges of Project Apollo. 
NASA had the support of the president, congress and nation which 
affected NASA culture positively. With its significant financial support, the agency 
did not worry about the funds and focused on the challenging lunar landing goal. 
This kept NASA away from the politics and bureaucracy involved in getting funds,  
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allowing the agency to protect its research-oriented cultural environment. The 
field centers did not have to compete among themselves to justify their existence 
at the expense of organizational performance.  
Another organizational component which was also well-aligned was the 
structure of the agency. Improvement and success in space exploration 
completely depended on innovation since the moon-landing task would be the 
first of its type. The knowledge, experience and technology were limited and 
needed to be developed. The size and complexity of the projects demanded 
project teams which have various technical skills and expertise. The nature of the 
tasks and the work needs of the people completing the work indicated that NASA 
required an adhocracy structure. This structure places high value on technical 
expertise, innovation, fast-decision making, autonomy and flexibility. Also, 
NASA’s adhocracy structure allowed the agency to change its internal shape 
frequently. Because of this ability to reshape itself to meet project needs, the 
agency centrally structured itself for the Apollo task. This restructuring eliminated 
the number of vertical layers of structure and allowed field centers to cooperate, 
enabling the centers to respond quickly to moon-landing requirements. 
The alignment of NASA’s culture with its task, people, resources, and 
structure in the first period (1958–1972)  culminated with the moon landing. 
NASA’s culture during this period and the close alignment or fit of the culture, 
tasks, people, resources, and structure were instrumental in the successful 
completion of this challenging project. 
 When contextual factors change, culture also changes (Heck & 
Marcoulides, 1993; Louis, 1985; Schein, 2004; Uttal 1983). NASA’s technical and 
research culture transformed into bureaucratic culture. After the agency’s specific 
moon landing task, new tasks were diversified. Resources were substantially 
limited to support the tasks. A flexible adhocracy structure was replaced with a 
bureaucratic structure. These changes in organizational components caused 
misalignments between culture and components which affected NASA’s 
performance. The agency’s management was not able to successfully manage 
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these changes and realign system components with each other and culture.  
Figure 11 displays the culture of NASA and its alignment with the system 
components in the second period (1996–2004). 
 
 
Figure 11.   The fit of NASA culture and organizational components (1996—2004) 
(After: McCaskey (1974); Nadler & Tushman (1997)) 
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Figure 11 clearly displays the system components and its attributes of our 
model during the Columbia period. One of the factors that contributed to the 
change in task component was that after NASA landed the first man on the 
moon, the concern that Russia might use space as a nuclear platform 
diminished. As a result, the agency’s mission became unclear, resulting in a 
significant diversification of tasks that remained very complex and still required 
new scientific and engineering knowledge.  In this atmosphere, NASA had to 
justify its existence; furthermore, in order to get funds it was required to develop 
diversified goals such as Skylab, the space shuttle program, the Hubble 
Telescope, and an orbiting international Space Center.   
The US’s deteriorating economic conditions and Vietnam War were 
pressing issues and Congress began to cut back the agency’s funds.  In an effort 
to further justify its existence, NASA designed the space shuttle as a reusable 
vehicle to assure Congress that space exploration would be cost-effective. 
Additionally, the work of the professionals in NASA, who formerly conducted 
engineering and scientific research, became less technical and more 
administrative.  NASA required project management skills and abilities because 
NASA increasingly relied on contractors to carry out its diversified portfolio of 
projects. In fact, NASA not only was contracting out production work but also 
design plans.  These changes created a rift between managers and engineers 
that affected NASA’s safety and technical culture.      
As NASA matured, so did its workforce.  The aging workforce became 
less ambitious and more resistant to change.  No longer was NASA an 
organization with a frontier mentality, but rather an organization fighting for 
survival.  In order to survive, the engineers and scientists had to embrace the 
change in tasks of being project managers.  By contracting out more, NASA was 
able to reduce costs and share liability with industry leaders.  Unfortunately, as 




longer were the engineers and scientists going through three iterations of safety 
testing as previously done.  The contractors were now responsible for the testing 
and retesting of products.   
Another way that this changed culture affected the people component was 
the “prove it is unsafe” belief.  Managers required engineers to prove a part or 
product was unsafe before a decision would be made to stop a shuttle launch.   
This new way of thinking was in conflict with the former culture of “prove it is 
safe” to launch. As a result, the safety culture suffered because engineers were 
unable to convince management to stop what they believed to be risky launches 
because these engineers still operated under assumptions that they only needed 
to disprove that it was safe to launch.   
Costs saving initiatives were implemented by management to help 
supplement shortfalls in the budget as well as further justify NASA’s existence.  
The diversified goals and resources available to support them were not well 
aligned.  There were not enough funds allocated by Congress to pay for the 
numerous goals NASA wanted to accomplish, so partnerships and outsourcing 
became valued.  For example, the International Space Station will be paid for by 
the international community and not just the United States.  This was a brilliant 
attempt for NASA to show cost savings and reduce its liability.  However, the 
space shuttle program was impacted negatively by the constrained resource 
environment.   
In an effort to reduce costs, NASA believed in a continuous flight plan. 
Management thought was that if NASA could launch more flights, then the overall 
cost per flight would decrease and result in savings.  Unfortunately, the strict 
flight schedule pressured management to send shuttles to space that may have 
been less safe.  This led to the development of the “prove it is unsafe” culture 
previously discussed.    
Along with this belief, some risks were treated as normal by management 
which created the normalization of risk phenomena.  There were scientists and 
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engineers who knew of the problems of  the space shuttle first-hand but did not 
voice their concern and did not inform the higher managers due to a culture that 
normalized deviance and required technical staff to “prove it is unsafe” to launch 
a shuttle.  Therefore, the budget constraints and flight schedule pressures 
increased the amount of risk managers were willing to accept and at the same 
time decreased safety awareness.   
Finally, the structure of the organization was not aligned with  the culture.  
More specifically, the safety culture was incongruent with how the organization 
was structured.  NASA is a highly technical organization that performs work that 
is extremely dangerous.  Therefore, safety should be the cornerstone of all 
operations.  Unfortunately, the Rogers Commission and Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board found this not to be true.  Both reports recommended that the 
Safety Office of the agency be independent of the research centers.  The Safety 
Office should report directly and only to the NASA Administrator.  The 
independence of the Safety Office would prevent any internal pressures that may 
influence results of investigation reports or recommendations to leadership.  
Therefore, we conclude that the bureaucratic structure and safety culture were in 
misalignment.   
NASA culture made a dynamic shift during Columbia period.  There were 
two common themes that resonated among the cultural variables and system 
components; these themes were 1.) Pressures from a constrained resource 
environment and 2.) The lack of a safety culture.  These two factors played a 
significant role in shaping the organizational culture of NASA.  The key variables 
from the change in culture; “prove it is unsafe,” normalization or risk, and 
declining flexibility greatly influenced the misalignment of culture with task, 
people, resources, and structure.  Therefore, we conclude these misalignments, 
which created performance gaps in NASA, contributed to the Columbia disaster.   
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